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ABSTRACT 
The research in this study was conducted to explore the influence that the Bergen 
County Prosecutor's Office Directive 05-01 had on the training and future preparations of 
all sworn police officers in Bergen County, New Jersey in response to active-shooter 
situations in the schools of their jurisdictions. Because attendance in schools is 
mandatory for children to the age of 16 in New Jersey it becomes imperative that the 
police departments of the state, and more specifically for the purpose of this study the 
police officers in Bergen County, are able to provide a safe learning environment while 
children are in attendance. 
The survey used in the study was sent to all municipal police departments in 
Bergen County, New Jersey (N = 68). Voluntary participation was requested from the 
administrators of each police department. 
This study can be described as cross-sectional descriptive non-experimental 
research. There were three research questions which guided the study. The researcher 
used descriptive statistical methods to address guiding questions one and two. To answer 
guiding question three the researcher used Chi-Squared ( ~ 2 )  statistical analyses. The 
analyses were conducted to determine what relationship the independent or predictor 
variables (total budget, total dollar amount of seized funds, number of sworn law 
enforcement officers, and total calls for service each from the calendar year 2007) had on 
each of the two dependant variables (the number of police officers designated to train 
others in active-shooter response and the frequency of training being conducted). 
Those analyses indicted two statistically significant relationships. The first was 
between the amount of forfeiture funds reported by municipal police departments and the 
number of police officers trained to train other police officers in active-shooter response 
tactics. The second statistically significant relationship found was between the total 
operating budget of municipal police departments in Bergen County, NJ and the amount 
of training being done in active-shooter response tactics. 
The study has contributed to decision making in the area of police training in 
active-shooter tactics and training. 
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Chapter I 
INTRODUCTION, PROBLEM AND PURPOSE 
Introduction 
Police departments across the United States have made changes to the way they 
will respond to critical-incidents that occur at schools located within their jurisdictions. 
The attack at Columbine High School (April 20, 1999) has served as a catalyst for the 
changes made by police agencies all over the country. In Bergen County, New Jersey 
changes were mandated by a directive, Directive 05-01 Active-Shooter Policy Initiative, 
from the Bergen County Prosecutor's Office in a memo dated April 11,2005 (see 
Appendix A). The memo clearly states that as of its distribution, it will become the 
policy of the county to have a unified and consistent active-shooter response policy. This 
policy, entitled the Standardization of Patrol Based Response to Active-Shooter 
Situations, was developed by and a final version was agreed upon by the Chiefs of Police 
at their February 24, 2005 Bergen County Chiefs of Police Association meeting, and 
became mandatory training for all sworn police officers in the county. Also contained in 
the directive was a completion of training date of September 1,2005 for all sworn police 
officers in the county. 
The basis for this type of county-wide response policy is in the understanding of 
the Chiefs of Police and other members of the law enforcement community in Bergen 
County that critical incidents are likely to produce multi-agency responses. Thls 
understanding includes critical incidents that occur in jurisdictions of small to mid-sized 
police departments throughout the county, and will most likely require the use of mutual- 
aid from neighboring municipal, county, state, and federal agencies to bring the event[s] 
to a resolution. Therefore, when police officers of different agencies are working 
together toward the successful resolution of a critical incident, they need to be trained in 
similar tactics. For police officers from multiple agencies to work safely and swiftly 
together in a critical-incident response they need the same basic awareness of tactics. 
Experts agree that violence in schools has become more of a problem since the 
late 1990s (Peterson & O'Neal, 2002). Society is increasingly exposed to violence and 
police officers must respond to more and different types of violent situations. One type 
of situation that is sadly becoming more common is the active-shooter in schools. 
Routine-activities theory by Kautt and Roncek (2007) reveals schools as criminal 
hotspots. The theory states that schools are likely locations for violence and criminal 
activity due to the familiarity of the location to the juvenile actors (Kautt & Roncek, 
2007). Active-shooters are not limited to education institutions; they are just as common 
in the work place and in other venues. Police must develop policies and tactics fluid and 
flexible enough that they may be employed in diverse locations. 
As a first-responder to an active shooting in a school, police must quickly assess 
and react to events taking place. To do this, police first-responders must have training in 
making assessments and formulating plans to enter schools and save lives. After the 
development of the Standardization of Patrol Based Response to Active-Shooter 
Situations by the Bergen County Chiefs of Police Association, and distribution of this 
policy by the Bergen County Prosecutor's Office, police officers in Bergen County will 
now respond to a critical incident like an active-shooter situation in a school setting in a 
unified manner. 
Although the terminology appears in the definition of terms section, it is fitting to 
define this phrase now that has been coined by law-enforcement professionals and that is 
used often in this analysis. The phrase is "Active-Shooter." An active-shooter is defined 
as a suspect[s] whose activity is immediately causing death and serious injury. The 
activity is not contained and there is an immediate risk of death or serious injury to 
potential victims (Borelli, 2005). 
Background 
Prior to the mid 1960s, police responded and resolved many types of potentially 
violent situations. These situations created a need for change in police tactics. The 
catalyst for this change was the deadly event at The University of Texas (August 1, 
1966), where Charles Whitman killed 15 people and wounded 31 others from the top of a 
clock tower. After this event, the modern Special Weapons And Tactics teams were born 
(Borelli, 2005). These new and specially trained groups of police officers responded to 
critical incidents of active-shooters in the process of killing innocent people; suspects 
barricading themselves into dangerous situations, and hostage takers holding innocent 
people captive. The new teams were trained in tactics that allowed for the successful 
resolution of these situations. 
Police officers not assigned to these specialized response teams were now being 
trained to respond and secure the scene to allow time to pass when specialized teams 
could respond. Time was considered the ally of the police to calm situations and allow 
for the response of special teams and negotiators who came along. 
Police departments everywhere again received a wake up call on April 20, 1999 in 
Littleton, CO. The lesson that day was that the days of police responding to an incident 
and waiting for S.W.A.T. to arrive were no longer acceptable when a violent actor was 
already taking lives. The police tactic of buying time was not a viable strategy against an 
actor[s] who had no intention of surrendering (Egan, 1999). A goal of the actors at 
Columbine High School was not to get out alive, as is frequently the case with this kind 
of event. In an active-shooter situation, suicide is often a part of the plan from the start 
(Scanlon, 2001). 
Police have now modified their assessment of what is expected by first- 
responding police officers to a critical or violent incident at a school. The new ideas are 
now taught in police academies all over the country that police are to respond, assess, 
plan, and engage. Allowing time to pass is the opposite of what responding police 
officers should do because violent events do not typically last more than 5 to 7 minutes 
(Wood, 2001). Calculating the average number of people shot during these active- 
shooting situations and the typical duration of the shooting, shows that once the shooting 
starts, someone is shot every 15 seconds (Tactical Response, 2008). If responses are 
divided into 15-second intervals, it is easy to see why police first-responders must not 
wait to take action to stop the killing. 
Statement of the Problem 
Because the study of law enforcement tactics and strategy is in its relative infancy 
and only now has begun to be seriously studied, there is a lack of information available 
on police training for active-shooter situations (O'Brien, 2008a). Although violent crime 
in schools and in general has been on the decline since the early 1990's (Kleck, 1999) 
police agencies must adapt to changing societal trends where violent critical incidents are 
becoming more common. In this adaptation, society should expect police officers to 
respond to violent situations and resolve the issues they are confronted by. One such 
issue is the active-shooter situation in a school, which is the foundation of this study. 
In this study the researcher attempts to determine if police officers in Bergen 
County are adequately prepared to respond and resolve an active-shooter incident in a 
school quickly. 
Purpose of the Study 
The researcher's purpose for this study was to explore the influence that the 
Bergen County Prosecutor's Office Directive 05-01 had on the training and future 
preparations of all sworn police officers in Bergen County, New Jersey in response to 
active-shooter situations in the schools of their jurisdictions. Because attendance in 
schools is mandatory for the children of New Jersey it becomes imperative that the police 
departments of the state, and more specifically for the purpose of this study the police 
officers in Bergen County, are able to provide a safe learning environment while children 
are in attendance. 
Guiding Questions 
Question 1. How have training efforts changed for police preparedness in responding 
to active-shooter situations in schools to create a safer learning environment for children 
since the September 1,2005 training mandate issued by the Bergen County Prosecutor's 
Office? (a) How are training efforts exposing officers to realistic environments? (b) 
How have police departments augmented response capabilities on the topic? 
Question 2. Why are police departments implementing or not implementing the 
Standardization of Patrol Based Response to Active-Shooter Situations model 
policy? 
Question 3. What factors account for the variability in the number of police officers 
designated to train others in active-shooter response and the frequency of training being 
done in police departments in active-shooter preparation in schools? 
Significance of the Study 
Up to this point, the literature in this field has presented an incomplete view of 
police response to shootings, active-shooters, and critical incidents in schools. Much of 
the literature and most studies this researcher has located on the topic are from the 
perspective of the school administrators' response to these situations, attempts at 
psychological profiles of the shooters and how the media interprets these events. 
Therefore, what can be uncovered from a study of this kind can assist police 
administrators in their preparation efforts to combat instances of dangerous and deadly 
violent situations at schools to better maintain a safer learning environment in the schools 
of Bergen County, NJ. As education administrators make the school facilities available 
for police training, police become better prepared to respond to crisis situations in 
schools. 
Most police departments in Bergen County, New Jersey are similar in their 
command structure. At the top, the chain of command has a Chief of Police or civilian 
Police Director. Outside the internal command, each police department operates under 
some direction by the county prosecutor's office, as the county prosecutor is the chief 
law-enforcement officer appointed by the governor for that county. Although staffing 
and area distinguish one police department from one another they are alike in many ways. 
How they differ in their preparedness to respond to an active-shooter situation is the 
foundation of this study. 
Many different methods are available to train for critical-incident responses, and 
experts in the field have not identified one method as better than any other. Each method 
is similar in its make-up and basic goal - respond and save lives by confronting and 
stopping the violent actor. 
Delimitations of the Study 
This study was designed to explore what police departments in one county 
(Bergen) in New Jersey are doing to prepare themselves better for a critical-incident 
response at a school after the distribution of, the Standardization of Patrol Based 
Response to Active-Shooter Situations model policy by the Bergen County Prosecutor's 
Office. The delimitations of the study were: only the 68 municipal police agencies in 
Bergen County, NJ listed on the Bergen County Prosecutors office website were included 
in the population (N=68), information to answer the guiding questions was derived from 
the survey instrument provided to the Chiefs of Police the Civilian Police Directors or 
their designees, the agencies provided with the survey instrument were also asked to 
return the completed instrument in three weeks. 
Limitations of the Study 
Limitations identify potential weaknesses in the study that derive from the design 
and methods of a study. The scope of this study focuses on the 68 municipal police 
departments in Bergen County, New Jersey. All 68 municipal police departments were 
included on the Bergen County Prosecutor's Office website. Since all municipal police 
departments in the county were included as participants, the research methodology can be 
considered a census. The number of agencies that return the completed survey 
instrument is a limitation of the study. The survey instrument used to solicit data was 
modeled after the United States Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Law 
Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics survey. The survey instrument, 
along with original questions related to active-shooter preparation prepared by the 
researcher was reviewed by a jury of experts in the field. 
Since this study is focused on one county in the state of New Jersey which has a 
total of 21 counties, the results of the study may not be indicative of the level of 
preparations by the police departments in the rest of the state. Therefore, any conclusions 
drawn from the study to apply to other municipal departments in the other counties, 
county or state police departments, are the responsibility of the reader. 
Another limitation of this study is that it is primarily focused on police response 
to active-shooter and critical incidents in primary, middle, and secondary schools. 
Although some mention is made of events that occur[ed] on college campuses, the study 
is limited to how police are responding to the school incidents. College and university 
active-shooter and critical incidents are mentioned to establish for the reader some key 
events that were either a catalyst for change or an especially violent incident where police 
had responded in the same manner as they would have to a lower grade level school. 
A section on higher education or college campus violence would not be practical 
in this study, as it would need its own study to truly report valuable information. Higher 
education institutions are not considered to be schools in terms of law enforcement, 
because the student body is comprised of adults. In addition many colleges and 
universities have their own police departments or security agencies and these agencies 
report to the FBI's Uniform Crime Report differently than a police department within a 
countylstate as per the Clery Act for reporting campus crime. The law enforcement 
agencies of state and private institutions may fall under the jurisdiction of the state 
attorney general's office rather than the county prosecutor's office. This too would 
eliminate campuses from the scope of this project as the present study is focused on 
municipal police departments in Bergen County, NJ. As a result it would not be 
appropriate for the researcher to draw conclusions about the training and preparations of 
campus police agencies when they work under different authority than those at the 
foundation of this study. 
Definitions of Terms 
The following are definitions that are relevant to this study: 
Active-shooter: "A suspect(s) activity is immediately causing death and serious 
bodily injury. The activity is not contained and there is a risk of death or serious bodily 
injury to potential victims" (Borelli, 2005, p 2.). 
Active-Shooter Team (AST): A team of three or four armed police officers tasked 
with finding and stopping an active-shooter. 
Critical incidents: terrorist activities, hostage taking, mass causality events, high- 
risk repetitive crimes, riots, or bombings 
Jurisdiction: The territorial range of authority or control. 
Police Officer: Any sworn member of a state, county, citylmunicipal police 
department empowered to uphold law and order with the power to arrest offenders for 
crimes, misdemeanors, and infractions of law. 
S. W.A.T. team: A team of police officers trained in Special Weapons And Tactics, 
equipped to respond to a variety of dangerous situations. 
Organization of the Study 
Chapter I has presented an introduction of the problem behind the study, a 
background, a statement of the problem, a purpose of the study, guiding questions, 
significance of the study, delimitations of the study, limitations of the study, definitions 
of terms, and a description of the organization of the study. Chapter 11 presents a review 
of pertinent literature, research and theory whlch contains; an introduction, background, a 
historical summary of events, traditional police tactics, legal mandates for change, new 
police tactics, problems with the new tactics, related research and theory to police 
administrators, school violence, a theoretical framework, and a summary. In Chapter 111 
the researcher describes the design and methods of the study by discussing; purpose, 
design, population, methods, instrumentation, and a conclusion. Chapter IV presents the 
collected data and the analysis of the data collected by frequency distributions and Chi- 
Square ( ~ 2 )  statistical analyses. Chapter V includes a summary of findings, discussion, 
and conclusions and recommendations for policy, practice and future research. 
Chapter I1 
REVIEW OF PERTINENT LITERATURE, RESEARCH AND THEORY 
Introduction 
The purpose for this study was to explore the influence that the Bergen County 
Prosecutor's Office Directive 05-01 had on the training and future preparations of all 
sworn police officers in Bergen County, New Jersey in response to active-shooter 
situations in their jurisdictions. This chapter presents a review of necessary adaptations 
police agencies, both in New Jersey and the United States have made to allow them to 
respond to critical incidents in school settings effectively, tactically and efficiently. 
These adaptations were based on the education the law enforcement community received 
from studying the events of April 20, 1999 at Columbine High School in Littleton, 
Colorado as well as from studying other critical incidents around the country. Although 
the shooting at Columbine was not the first time a United States school had been the 
scene of a deadly attack by either a student or an adult, it did however, have a lasting 
effect on the law enforcement community. The attack effectively showed law 
enforcement professionals that they were not adequately prepared to respond to this type 
of situation and to gain control quickly. 
Until the Virginia Tech massacre (April 16,2007) where 33 people were killed 
and another 30 were injured (Shapira & Jackman 2007), the Columbine High School 
incident was the most deadly shooting to take place in a school setting in the United 
States, with 15 fatalities (Egan, 1999). The Columbine High School incident forever 
changed how the law enforcement community will plan for, train for, and react to a 
critical incident. In light of such an eye opening for U.S. law enforcement, police tactics 
have been revised and have been adapted to allow police to respond more appropriately 
to a critical incident of this nature. These new tactics lend themselves for a response not 
only in a school setting, but in the work place, a private home, a night club or other venue 
that may come under attack by a would be killer. 
In chapter I1 the researcher reviews the history of the formation of police tactics 
and what event was instrumental to the establishment of these traditional tactics. The 
analysis addresses school settings including the Columbine High School tragedy, which 
served as the catalyst for changes in tactical responses by police departments all over the 
country. Historical events are an important component of this review because they show 
how traditional police tactics to respond to critical incidents began, how they changed 
and how they were sometimes inadequate. An understanding of what police response 
tactics were is vital to understand how and why they need to evolve to be more effective. 
The researcher then provides a description of traditional police response tactics, 
why they are in need of revision and what these revisions include. Developing an 
understanding of what the traditional tactics of police response were helps the readers 
gain insight into why they have become ineffective in many situations. The researcher 
next discusses legal mandates for change at the local, state and federal levels. A 
description of the new police tactics to respond to critical incidents demonstrates how 
police react to critical situations, in a post-Columbine era. An indepth description of 
these new tactics, some dubbed Active-Shooter Response or critical incident response, 
suggest the path the law enforcement community has followed to update and make 
responses more tactically sound to respond rapidly and save more lives. Columbine and 
other school settings have shown the need for cooperation among agencies in critical 
incidents. The school backdrop remains a main theme in the present study because tax 
dollars are used to fund both police and educational institutions. Because children are 
required to go to school they become potential targets at the very institutions where their 
attendance is mandatory. 
The review then turns toward training, with a focus on the benefits of training for 
preparedness and providing police officers with the necessary skills to complete their 
mission to save lives. The problems associated with training police officers with the new 
critical incident response tactics are explored. Some of these difficulties are getting 
police officers to act like tactical teams and focusing on what is most important; the 
mission at hand. 
Related research and theory as they relate to both police and school violence are 
discussed. Numerous theories and studies are critiqued as they form the foundation of 
police response and why school violence happens and if there are effective indicators as 
to who is committing it. 
The analysis contains a summary followed by a section in which the researcher 
describes how the evolution of these new tactics should progress so that police can 
continue to be effective and relevant to our rapidly changing and ever more violent 
society. If police are going to be challenged with resolving these types of critical 
incidents they need training, training and more training. 
The effectiveness of these new response tactics is crucial for police to be able to 
protect the lives of children who are mandated to attend school, and the safety of all 
citizens in all types of venues. Therefore an analysis of where police tactics were and 
where they are going to be in the future is important to maintain the safety of our society. 
Without periodic reviews of how police are preparing for their jobs, in an ever changing 
society, the police become stagnate and ineffective. A review of response plans, 
strategies and tactics allows for changes to be made for police to become more proficient 
in their job performance. As more police agencies are exposed to these situations the 
more the law enforcement community has the opportunity to study how to resolve the 
situations in the safest manner. 
Research and theory are presented through the use of relevant articles, studies, 
professional journals, legal mandates, periodicals and books, as well as first hand 
knowledge of the researcher and others, to provide the basis for this analysis. 
Background 
Until the mid 1960s all situations that required a response within a police 
department's jurisdiction were handled by the department's patrol-first responders. This 
meant that the "ordinary police officer" on a beat was called to handle whatever 
happened while the officer was on duty. All calls for police service, such as drunk and 
disorderly people to domestic violence to robberies and shootings, were taken care of by 
the patrol squad on the street. 
This changed on August 1, 1966 in Austin, Texas. Events on this date served as a 
catalyst for change in American policing practices at the time. On August 1, 1966, 
Charles Whitman, trained to shoot by the United States Marine Corps, forced entry into a 
clock tower building at the University of Texas. In tote with him were three rifles, two 
handguns, a shotgun and hundreds of rounds of ammunition. Oddly enough he also 
brought with him a five gallon bucket of drinking water and some sandwiches. He had 
obviously planned to be there for some time (Borelli, 2005). 
From the top of the clock tower, Whitman killed 15 people and wound 3 1 others, 
some as far as two blocks away. Prior to his assault on the university he had also killed 
his mother and wife. The first two responding police officers on the scene at the 
university, who incidentally just happened to be on campus, teamed with other 
responding police and a civilian and made a brave move to launch their own assault. 
This ad hoc team advanced on the tower from an underground passage and made their 
way inside to confront Whitman. Armed with handguns and a shotgun the team was able 
to draw Whitman's fire so he stopped shooting at innocent people on the campus. In the 
gun battle that followed, the team killed Whitman and ended his killing spree (Borelli, 
2005). 
As with most critical or serious incidents that law enforcement professionals face, 
there were both a debriefing and a subsequent study of the scene as well as the outcome. 
Debriefings and studies of events are tools used to tweak tactics to make them more 
effective in the future. This incident was no different. The University of Texas shooting 
showed law enforcement personnel that there was a need for highly skilled professionals 
to handle these types of situations in the future. The team of officers who came on scene 
was courageous enough to take the battle to the killer, hut all situations like this may not 
be handled in as brave a manner. Law enforcement professionals who reviewed the 
incident concluded there was a need for tactically minded police officers to be specially 
trained and equipped to handle a variety of situations. Born out of this incident were the 
modem Special Weapons And Tactics teams, known as S.W.A.T. teams (Borelli, 2005). 
Since the early 1970's, S.W.A.T. teams and similar teams with their own 
interesting and unique monikers like Emergency Services Unit (ESU) and Emergency 
Response Team (ERT) began to he formed in police departments all over the country. 
This was also a time when military veterans were returning from the Vietnam Conflict 
and there was an abundance of tactically trained and battle tested young men to form 
tactical teams (Borelli, 2005). The term "men" is used here because at the time policing 
in the United States was a maledominated profession. In 1971 after the end Vietnam 
Conflict, only 1.4% of all police officers in the United States were women (Home, 2006). 
Decades later females became more of a factor in law enforcement. Females in policing 
by 2006 made up about 13 - 14% of sworn law enforcement officers in the US (Home, 
2006). 
The newly formed professional teams were tasked with responding to various 
types of critical incidents. Team members became the experts on responding and 
handling situations, although not in every agency were these professionals assigned to 
this task exclusively. Most team members were assigned full-time to other areas of 
policing and to the special team on a part-time basis. From the 1970s to the 1990s special 
teams were called upon to handle situations that were above and beyond the capabilities 
of patrol-first responders. 
In the decade, from 1996 to 2006 there have been at least 80 incidents where guns 
were either brought to schools to take hostages, or kill students andlor teachers and 
principals in the United States (School Violence Resource Center, 2007). Until April 
2007 on the campus of the Virginia Polytechnic Institute (more commonly known as 
Virginia Tech or VT) in Blacksburg, VA, the most deadly assault on a school was at 
Columbine High School in Littleton, Colorado in 1999 (Shapira & Jackrnan 2007). The 
result of this incident was 12 students and one teacher dead, at least 24 wounded and two 
killers who committed suicide (Borelli, 2005). The Columbine High School tragedy took 
the breath away from the American public. Not because they had not seen school 
violence before. They certainly had, in the 3 years prior to the Columbine tragedy there 
were at least 16 school violence incidences, most of which ended with deadly 
consequences (School Violence Resource Center, 2007). However, this incident 
highlighted the vulnerability of schools and campuses around the country. 
What America saw the day of the Columbine High School tragedy, live via the 
news media on scene, were police agencies and their officers respond to the school 
campus and secure a perimeter. Some estimates are that approximately 120 police 
officers responded to the scene (Shepard, 2006). None of the responding police 
immediately entered the building to confront and/or stop the killing of students and a 
teacher. Why did some of the 120 armed police officers a enter a building where lives 
were being taken by two high school students? 
Was this what was expected of police agencies, to sit and wait for a safe situation 
to enter? In fact it was. The S.W.A.T. era had brought new policies for police responses. 
Police officers were no longer being taught to act on and take care of every situation as 
they had in the past. At one point in time the police were the last line of defense, now the 
police called on their S.W.A.T. teams to be their last line of defense. 
Historical Summary of Events 
According to the School Violence Resource Center (2007) and an Infoplease 
(2008) internet document, the attacks described in Table 1, were carried out or were 
planned to occur in schools across the country (in 30 of the 50 states) since the attack at 
Columbine High School in April 1999. Each item in Table 1 required a police response 
to a private residence or school, either to thwart an attack in progress or to intervene in 
the implementation of a planned attack. Table 2 is a compilation or frequency 
distribution of occurrences listed in Table 1 by state. 
Klein (2005) asserted that popular discourse addressed school shootings almost 
obsessively, but continued to omit the role gender plays in these crimes. New research 
has suggested that this omission was ignoring a key element: a significant number of the 
boys' own stated reasons for this violence clearly pointed to premeditated violence 
specifically involving girls (Klein, 2005). A review of Table 1 shows the absence of 
absolutes in the events. It is important to note a quote from George Santayana, that 
"those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it" (Santayana, 1905, p. 
13). Therefore, similar events need to be positioned together to he able to form a 
complete picture of what could happen at any time. 
Although the events were primarily staged and carried out by males, the event on 
October 4,2002 in San Antonio, TX describes a female actor. Most attacks occurred 
inside schools in hallways, classrooms, gymnasiums, and bathrooms; however, some 
occurred outside of the schools on the grounds and in parking lots. The events took place 
in urban, suburban, and rural settings across all socio-economic strata. When seen 
through the lens of masculinity theory, the killings of girls who had rejected assailants 
can be explained as an effort to reverse the feelings of subordination and inadequacy the 
assailants experienced as a result of being rejected (Klein, 2005). Victims were teachers, 
students and sometimes bystanders, both male and female. Actors in the events ranged 
from children (6 years old) to adults. 
Table 1 
School Violence Incidents, 1999-2008, - Requiring a Police Response to a Private 
Residence or School, Either to Thwart an Attack in Progress or Intervene in the 
Implementarion of a Planned Attack 
1. April 20, 1999: Littleton, CO. Two boys, ages 16 and 17, shoot 35 students and 1 
teacher before committing suicide. Twelve students and 1 teacher die. 
2. May 13, 1999: Port Huron, MI. Two 14 year-olds plotted to kill at least 154 
people at school in an attempt to outdo the shooting at Columbine High School. 
They were stopped when fellow students reported them. 
3. May 20, 1999: Conyers GA. A 15 year old wounds six classmates. 
4. October 28, 1999: Cleveland, OH. A 14 year old and three 15 year olds planned 
on killing mostly black students, then die in a shoot out with police. The plot was 
reported by a parent. 
5. November 19, 1999: Deming, NM. A 12 year old shoots a classmate in the head. 
The victim died the following day. 
6. December 6, 1999: Fort Gibson, OK. A 71h grade student brings a handgun to 
school and opens fire. Four students are wounded. 
7. January 29,2000: Cupertino, CA. A 19 year old planned to attack his high school 
with guns and explosives. He took photos of himself and his arsenal of weapons. 
When the photos were developed the drugstore clerk called the police. 
8. February 29,2000: Mount Morris Township, MI. A 6 year old boy brings a .32 
caliber semi auto handgun to school and kills a first grader. 
9. March 10, 2000: Savannah, GA. Two students killed by a 19 year old student 
while leaving a high school dance. 
10. May 11,2000: Prairie Grove, AR. A 13 year old seventh grade student who left 
the Prairie Grove Junior High in a fit of rage and a police officer were wounded 
after shooting each other in a hay field north of the school. 
11. May 18,2000: Millbrae, CA. A 17 year old with a history of threatening other 
students with guns was reported to officials by fellow students when he threatened 
to do a "Columhine" type shooting. 
12. May 26,2000: Lake Worth, FL. A 13 year old sent home from school returned 
with a handgun and kills a teacher. 
13. September 26, 2000: New Orleans, LA. A student fought with another student, 
went home, returned with a gun, and killed the student he fought with earlier. 
14. October 24, 2000: Glendale, AZ. A teenager held a teacher and 32 students 
hostage for an hour before surrendering. 
15. January 10,2001: Oxnard, CA. A 17 year old entered school and took a girl 
hostage in an attempt to commit "suicide by cop." After S.W.A.T. arrived he was 
shot dead. 
16. January 17,2001: Baltimore, MD. A student was shot and killed in front of Lake 
Clifton Eastern High School. 
17. February 5,2001: Hoyt, KS. Three students, ages 16, 17, and 18 planned to do a 
school shooting. An anonymous caller reported the boys to the police using a tip 
line. When the homes of the three were searched police found guns, bombs and 
white supremacist drawings. 
18. February 7,2001: Fort Collins, CO. A 14 year old and two 15 year olds plot to 
"redo Columbine." Several classmates alerted the police after overhearing them 
talking about it. 
19. February 11,2001: Palm Harbor, FL. A 14 year built a bomb having a kill radius 
of 15 feet. The parents of another student alerted police of the bomber's plans. 
20. February 14,2001: Elmira, NY. A high school student's plans for a school 
shooting were foiled after students brought the fact that he had weapons on him to 
the attention of the teacher. He carried 14 pipe bombs, 3 smaller bombs, a 
propane tank, a sawed off shotgun, and a .22 caliber pistol into the school by a 
duffel bag and also a book bag full of ammunition. 
21. March 5,2001: Santee, CA. A 15 year old opens fire from inside a school 
bathroom shooting 15 and killing 2. 
22. March 7,2001: Twentynine Palms, CA. Two 17 year old boys were arrested after 
police were tipped off by another student about a planned attack of their high 
school. A search of the boys' homes revealed a gun in one home and a plan in the 
other. 
23. March 7,2001: Williamsport, PA. A 14 year old brings his father's handgun to 
school and shoots a classmate in the shoulder. 
24. March 22,2001: El Cajon, CA. Three teens and two teachers were wounded at 
Granite Hills High School by gunfire. 
25. March 30,2001: Gary, IN. A student was shot in the head while waiting for class 
to begin. 
26. January 15,2002: New York, NY. A teenager wounded two students at Martin 
Luther King Jr. High School. 
27. October 4,2002: San Antonio, TX. A 13 year old female middle school student 
fatally shot herself in the temple with a hadgun in the parking lot in front of a 
group of friends. 
28. November 19,2002: Hoover, AL. Two 17 year old males were reportedly 
fighting in a hallway when one student pulled a knife and stabbed the other to 
death. 
29. November 22,2002: Dallas, TX. A 15 year old male student was shot as he and 
fellow students try to wrestle a gun from another 14 year old student. 
30. December 12, 2002: Seattle, WA. A 13 year old male fired a rifle in a middle 
school, injuring two students with broken glass, and then used the gun to kill 
himself. 
31. December 16,2002: Chicago, IL. An 18 year old male high school student was 
fatally shot outside of Englewood High School, while trying to protect his sister 
from two other male students. 
32. January 22,2003: Providence, RI. A 1 2 ' ~  grade student was arrested for firing a 
.22 caliber gun inside the school's cafeteria after an assistant principal broke up a 
fight. 
33. January 27,2003: Cresent, OK. Three eighth grade middle school students were 
arrested for allegedly carrying pipe bombs into their school. 
34. January 30,2003: St. Paul, MN. A 14 year old middle school student was stabbed 
in the shoulder. Two teenage males were arrested for the incident. 
35. January 30.2003: Jenks. OK. A 17 vear old male student armed with a 9 mm 
- .  
handgun climbed onto the roof of the school's gym and threatened suicide. The 
student also had pointed the gun at an assistant principal. 
36. February 5,2003: Westminster, CO. After several shots being fired in a high 
school courtyard, a 14 year old student was taken into custody. 
37. March 1 I, 2003: Gilbert, AZ. Six youths were identified by police as plotting to 
do a "Columbine-style massacre" at their high school. Police and school officials 
found notes and plans for bombs as well as other violent plans. 
38. March 17,2003: Guttenberg, IA. A 17 year old walked into his high school 
principal's office to thank the principal for listening to his problems. The boy 
then pulled a rifle out of his coat and shot himself in the stomach. 
39. March 21,2003: Lawndale, CA. Two teenage high school males were arrested 
after police learned of a list the two had with names of students and teachers who 
were targets. An unfinished pipe bomb and directions to make the bomb 
downloaded from the internet were found in one of their homes. 
40. April 1,2003: Washington, DC. A 16 year old male high school student was shot 
in the leg during a lunch time argument with another student. 
41. April 16,2003: Addison, TX. A 12 year old student committed suicide by 
shooting herself in a private school bathroom. 
42. April 23,2003: Houston, TX. A 16 year old male student received a 7 inch slash 
across the chest in a fight outside his high school during lunch period. 
43. April 24,2003: Red Lion, PA. A 14 year old junior high student shot and killed 
the principal inside a crowded cafeteria then killed himself with a second gun. 
44. May 23,2003: Texas City, TX. A bomb was found in the home of a 16 year old 
high school student who had plans to kill the school districts' chief of police. 
45. September 18,2003: Atlanta, GA. A 14 year old Lovejoy High School student 
was arrested after police said he planned a "Columbine-style massacre" at his 
school. 
46. September 24,2003: Cold Spring, MN. One student dead and another injured 
after a shooting in the high school. A teacher was able to talk the shooter into 
surrendering. 
47. August 14,2003: Columbus, GA. A 14 year old girl went back to her middle 
school to visit old teachers. A fight broke out behind the school. As a crowd 
gathered one of the boys fighting took out a gun and started to shoot. The girl 
was killed. 
48. August 30,2004: Maywood, IL. A 22 year old waiting to pick up his younger 
brother was shot and killed in a high school parking lot in an apparent gang 
related crime. 
49. September 14,2004: Memphis, TN. A 15 year old male was killed in a gang 
initiation "jump in" fight in a school bathroom that got out of hand. 
50. October 7,2004: Newburyport, MA. A 15 year old male high school student shot 
and killed himself outside of his high school. A result of an argument with a 
female student. 
51. November 17,2004: Hempstead, NY. A 17 year old was stabbed to death blocks 
from school in a lunch time gang related fight. 
52. November 22,2004: Philadelphia, PA. An 18 year old former student was shot 
and killed as two others were injured in a shooting that occurred outside a high 
school. 
53. November 24,2004: Valparaiso, IN. A 15 year old wielding 2 knives stabbed 7 
classmates. No one died. 
54. December 10,2004: Nine Mile Falls, WA. A 16 year old student shoots himself 
in the head in the entryway of h ~ s  high school. He later died from his wound. 
55. March 21, 2005: Red Lake, MN. A 16 year old kills his grandfather and 
companion at home, then a teacher, a security guard, 5 other students and himself 
at school for a total of 10 dead. 
56. August 25, 2006: Essex, VT. A gunman looking for an old girlfriend bursts into 
an elementary school and kills a teacher. 
57. September 13,2006: Van Nuys, CA. A student is shot and killed in a crosswalk 
in front of school in an apparent gang-related crime. 
58. September 25, 2006: Las Vegas, NV. After getting off a school bus a student 
opened fire at the bus. None of the 34 students on board was injured. 
59. September 27, 2006: Bailey, CO. An adult male sexual predator enters a school, 
assaults 6 female students, kills a girl trying to flee, then kills self as police make 
entry to stop him. 
60. September 29,2006: Cazenovia, WI. A 15 year old student, disciplined the day 
before, enters school with multiple weapons and shoots the principal. 
61. October 2,2006: Nickel Mines, PA. An adult male sexual predator enters a one 
room Amish school and kills 6 female students and self. 
62. October 9,2006: Joplin, MO. A Columbine copy-cat, a 13 year old male, fires 
one round into the ceiling of the school as his gun jams. A teacher talked him into 
leaving. 
63. October 18,2006: Orlando, FL. In a fight that began in lunch period over a girl, a 
15 year old student was stabbed multiple times with a serrated knife. The student 
later died. 
64. January 3,2007: Tacoma, WA. An 18 year old student shoots 17 students in 
hallway of Henry Foss High School 
65. October 10,2007: Clevelmd, OH. A 14 year old student at Cleveland High 
School shot and injured two students and two teachers before shooting and killing 
himself. 
66. February 11,2008: Memphis, TN. In a gym class a 17 year old Mitchel High 
School student shot and wounded another student. 
67. February 12,2008: Oxnard, CA. A 14 year old boy shot a student at Green Junior 
High School causing the victim to become brain dead. 
(School Violence Resource Center, 2007; Infoplease, 2008) 
The researcher assembled Table 1 to highlight what was (and is) happening at 
schools all over the country. Cohen and Felson (1979) wrote that several conditions 
need to be present for some types of predatory violations to occur. They claim that for a 
predatory violation to be successful an offender must possess criminal inclinations and 
have the ability to carry out those inclinations, there must be a suitable target, and the 
absence of a guardian capable of prevention of the criminal act must also be present 
(Cohen & Felson, 1979). Cohen and Felson (1979) continued to assert that the absence 
of any one of the conditions described is normally sufficient to prevent predatory 
violations. According to Small and Tetrick (2001) students are less likely to be victims 
of serious violent and nonfatal crimes at schools than away from them. American 
schools are relatively safe places for children to be. Beger (2003) contended that widely 
publicized incidents of juvenile violence in public schools have created the public 
misconception that such behavior is commonplace. Although there are not deadly violent 
acts at schools every day, these examples are an indication of the need for police to be 
specially trained to respond to and handle serious assaults and killings on school campus' 
around the country. Certain areas are more subject to crime because they have suitable 
targets, and offenders subjectively perceive these areas as feasible locations for criminal 
acts (Knautt & Roncek, 2007). Columbine became a wake up call for police who need 
to be prepared for this type of incident (Associated Press, 1999). 
Table 1 does not account for shootings on college campuses. College campuses are 
likely to be patrolled by either campus police departments or campus security 
departments. Although other police agencies would likely respond to a college campus 
during a crisis in a mutual aid capacity, the focus of this research is the municipal police 
departments' preparation. Violent situations, active-shooters, or critical incidents on 
college campuses would be an excellent topic of a future study or research project. 
Table 2 was assembled to reiterate for the reader that there is no one state in the 
United States that is more susceptible than another to host violent events in schools or 
private residences. Table 2 shows that events are just as likely in rural, suburban, urban, 
wealthy, middle-class, and poor areas of the country. 
Table 2 
Frequency Distribution by State on Events Provided in Table I (April 20, 1999 to 
February 2008) 
State Freauencv State Frequency State Frequency State Freauency 
AL 1 AR 1 AZ 2 CA* 10 
CO 4 D.C. **1 FL 3 GA 4 
IA 1 IL 2 IN 2 KS 1 
LA 1 MA 1 MD 1 MI 2 
MN 3 MO 1 NM 1 NV 1 
NY 3 ,OH 2 OK 3 PA 4 
RI 1 TN 2 TX 5 WA 3 
WI 1 VT 1 
* The city of Oxnard, CA had two reported incidents 
** Washington D.C. 
Traditional Police Tactics 
Prior to the birth of the S.W.A.T. concept, ordinary police officers handled every 
situation. The teams would respond to an incident, gather intelligence, formulate a plan 
of action and execute the plan. After the arrival of S.W.A.T., patrol officers were taught 
they need not be as aggressive and assume the risk of encountering armed gunmen or 
assailants: professionals would handle that type of situation (Borelli, 2005). This became 
the new and what is referred to from this time on in this study as the "traditional 
response," in which the policing personnel were to respond and wait. 
Police administrators began to advocate the training of patrol officers in a support 
role for the specially trained teams. Police began to train for responding to critical 
incidents, setting up perimeters and securing the area for the special response. Patrol's 
response edict became to isolate, contain, and negotiate. These methods were used as a 
sort of clock-stopping mechanism to buy time for the "specials" to arrive (Baker, 2005). 
Present for the Columbine School siege was a School Resource Officer or SRO, a 
police officer who is stationed at the school to handle whatever problem that may arise on 
campus. Normally, this is the police officer who knows the layout of the school the best 
and is most familiar with the school and how to move around in it. While stationed at the 
school, this officer should be continuously gathering intelligence about the school, the 
teachers, staff, and the students. This intelligence may be used for purpose of detection 
and prevention of problems before they arise and deterrence of violent attacks. However, 
this officer remained behind cover, safe, while students were still being killed in the 
building, rather than to enter and confront the shooters (Kopel, 2006). 
The traditional practice of containment of the situation and waiting for S.W.A.T. 
to arrive had been in practice since the 1970s. Hostage takers and barricaded suspects 
were very adequately handled by securing an area and calling for negotiators to come and 
try to resolve the matter. Some events can be controlled by buying extra time and 
allowing for reasoning with the aggressor to take place (Scanlon, 2001). 
S.W.A.T. tactics are normally slow and deliberate movements made to insure the 
safety of the team members. Once a team has made entry into a building or other facility, 
members move slowly as a cohesive unit. The team members clear every space they 
occupy and pass by before moving on to the next possible threat. The time needed by a 
single S.W.A.T. team to clear a building the size of Columbine High School methodically 
could be hours. At Columbine, three teams were eventually inserted into the building. 
However, if there is an active-shooter, who is seriously wounding andlor killing 
people, the first responding officers need to make a rapid assessment of the incident and 
make entry to stop the suspect[s] (Scanlon, 2001). The breakdown of the traditional-style 
police response at Columbine was that the first arriving officers responded, but then held 
and waited for S.W.A.T. The S.W.A.T. team arrived and began its assessment and 
eventual entry into the building. This entry was criticized by some as being too slow and 
methodical, which is, incidentally, what these teams are known for, slow and methodical 
searches (Egan, 1999). 
The shooting in Columbine High School was over in 16 minutes, more than 
double the average amount of time these types of situations last, which by some estimates 
is between 5 to 7 minutes (Wood, 2001). The first-entry team entered the building at 
approximately 46 minutes after the shooting had begun, or 30 minutes after the killing 
had stopped. A review of the incident and its many hazards including the multiple bombs 
and IEDs (improvised explosive devices) can certainly justify the type of slow 
methodical response that S.W.A.T. used (Marx & Mayhood, 2001). However, to 
horrified parents or concerned citizens watching the media coverage, the thought 
certainly was that the police should go into the school and save the kids inside. 
This slow response by a tactical team would be warranted by the information 
police were developing about the numerous explosions that had already gone off inside 
the school. They were also receiving information about the location of other explosive 
devices planted in and around the school and in cars located in the parking lots. Police 
were being told by students who escaped the school that there were as many as eight 
gunmen in the building, snipers on the roof and gunmen in the ceilings (Associated Press, 
1999). 
The rule of thumb in most police circles is that the police cannot help anyone if 
they are injured themselves. Had the S.W.A.T. team just rushed into the building they 
very well may have been the next set of victims in the massacre. Bombs squads had also 
responded and begun to make their own evaluations of the scene. 
Police, prior to 1999, had been trained to make assessments, gather information, 
set up command posts and make the proper notifications. There was no textbook 
response for a situation like this one because this was a relatively new type of incident 
(Associated Press, 1999). In this case police were just reacting. 
For police to begin to deal with this situation effectively other resources were 
needed to be requested to handle various parts of the job. Responding units need updated 
and timely information on which location is the safest to respond. Officers need to know 
the location of the command post so they will know where to report in once on scene. 
The one aspect of this response that was glaringly absent was a determination by 
someone, a leader, a supervisor, a ranking officer to give the order to make entry to the 
facility and confront the shooter[s] to stop the killing of innocent people. This way of 
thinking only came as a result of the Columbine tragedy. In the aftermath, the incident 
was reviewed and dissected, and in doing so law enforcement professionals realized that 
something needed to happen. These traditional police response tactics had been shown to 
be ineffective for the Columbine type of crisis. Tactics that police were using needed to 
change, was the conclusion recognized on the federal, state and local levels of law 
enforcement. 
Legal Mandates for Change 
Following highly publicized campus shootings law makers have had to make 
school safety more of a priority (Beger, 2003). In the wake of Columbine, the United 
States government response to the issue of critical incidents in schools and on college 
campuses has been to make grant monies available so that school administrators could 
work with law enforcement personnel to implement safety programs (Bethel, 2005). 
These anti-violence campaigns are useful in prevention and in the education of students 
and educators. 
Through the many pages and documents this researcher has reviewed to collect 
details for the literature review, most of the literature in professional journals on this 
topic was found to be directed toward school preparation and response: The law 
enforcement element of this topic was not as widely discussed or researched. There 
seems to be a failure to address the issue of the successful resolution of a violent andlor 
critical incident in a school or on a college campus. Since the Virginia Tech massacre the 
federal government made additional monies available for the training and equipping of 
campus police officers to respond to critical incidents on campuses. 
In January of 2002 the State of New Jersey passed legislation which created a 
School Violence Awareness Week. This legislation was intended to make it known that 
it is in the public interest of the state to designate a week in October of each year as 
"School Violence Awareness Week" to provide students, parents, school district and law 
enforcement personnel with an opportunity to discuss methods to keep schools safe from 
violence, to create school safety plans, and to recognize those students in need of help. 
In Bergen County, New Jersey a directive (Directive 05-01) was distributed to all 
Police Chiefs within the county mandating basic training for all active sworn law 
enforcement officers employed therein in a uniform and consistent active-shooter 
response. This training was required to be completed by September 1, 2005. Bergen 
County distributed a model policy to police agencies, to adopt as their own or modify as 
necessary to suit the needs of their respective jurisdiction. 
Not until July, 2007, did the State of New Jersey follow suit by mandating that all 
police departments have and maintain a policy and procedure for an active-shooter 
response. This directive created mandatory training of all police recruits in the topic area 
of active-shooter response while recruits are engaged in a police academy training 
curriculum (NJ Attorney General Directive 2007-01). 
In September, 2007, a report, "K-12 School Security Task Force Report" was 
presented to New Jersey Governor Jon Corzine. This report discussed the topic of safer 
schools throughout the state and concluded with recommendations for a distribution of 
model policies on topic areas such as: active-shooter, bomb threats, lockdown, evacuation 
and a public information officer (School Security Task Force, 2007). (As of late 2008, 
the researcher has not located the model policies to have been distributed). 
Progress is being made in school safety. A U.S. Department of Education survey 
found that 96% of public schools required visitors to sign in before entering the school 
building (National Center for Education Statistics, 1998). According to Garcia (2003) the 
good news is that school homicide and violence is down, however the bad news is that 
the number of rare multiple victim school shootings had increased in the mid 1990s. 
New Police Tactics 
Environment is a powerful inhibitor or facilitator of crime and situational 
prevention strategies can affect its likelihood of occurrence (Cohen & Felson, 1979; 
Weisburd et al., 2006). American schools have had to alter how they do business and 
how they protect their students (Harper, 2000). 
Active-shooters typically work within a plan they have developed. These plans 
arc normally tactically laid out and well developed. These plans typically will include 
rmdomly shooting victims, as many as they can, before committing suicide. Not many 
of these actors are motivated by "getting out alive" or eventually having their day in 
court; suicide is usually a part of the plan (Scanlon, 2001). Time, which had always been 
the ally of the responding specialized teams en route to the crisis, is now worlung against 
them (Egan, 1999). 
The first responding police to the scene of an active-shooter situation are now 
responsible for making a rapid assessment of not only all of the previously mentioned 
criteria, but now they must decide whether to form up into teams and launch an assault of 
their own. This assault goes by many different names. In New Jersey it is called Active- 
Shooter Response by law enforcement, in Ohio it is called QUAD or Quick Action 
Deployment, in other areas of the country it is known as Immediate Action Rapid 
Deployment (IARD). Regardless of the name of the deployment tactics, most are nearly 
identical in practice. They all are based upon the first responding police officers to a 
scene, equipping themselves and forming up into three or four-person teams. These 
teams are sometimes known as ASTs, short for Active-Shooter Teams. The officers or 
teams then make an entry into the structure or facility that is under attack and as quickly 
as possible find the aggressor[s] and stop them. 
These types of tactics are situation-dependant though. They are not the answer to 
every situation. If the officers are responding to a hank robbery or to a hostage situation, 
these tactics are not appropriate. Police rushing into these types of events may cause 
more harm than good. Time has always proven to be an asset when dealing with an event 
in the absence of gunfire or killing. That being said, if there is shooting going on or if 
people are being assaulted or killed the police have a moral obligation to make entry to 
try to save innocent lives (Lloyd, 2000). 
The premise behind the new system of tactics is quite simple. After an initial 
assessment is made and information is provided to the police that there is an active- 
shooter in a building or facility, the police will enter to locate and stop the shooting. This 
is done in a rapid but organized manner and with tactics that have been shown to be 
effective. The officers will form into three or four-person teams, preferably the latter. If 
they have special equipment, they equip themselves as such. Some special equipment 
may include: breaching tools (tools used to open doors and windows forcibly), assault 
type rifles /long guns, extra gear such as ballistic helmets and tactical vests that carry 
extra handcuffs and magazines loaded with ammunition or first aid equipment. 
The team leader - whoever in the group is the most tactically minded or the best 
thinker under pressure, regardless of rank - will direct the team to the chosen entry point. 
In this regard the mission has the greatest chance for success; ability is put before ego 
(Giduck, 2005). Safety is always a concern but speed is important. The team will stack 
(a single-file formation) prior to entry into the building and perform a quick gear check to 
make sure all team members have what they need. The team then enters the site. 
Team members each have specific responsibilities. Once inside a structure the 
team spreads out into a diamond formation. The front or first person inside is responsible 
for all threats that are ahead of the team. The second person or the right side in the 
diamond-style formation covers threats to the right of the group. This is typically the 
team leader position. The threats may include windows or doors the group will pass. 
The left side or third person will cover all threats to the left. The last or fourth person is 
responsible for the rear safety, essentially to protect the group from any threat from the 
rear and everything the group has already passed. This position is very difficult for two 
reasons; this operator is (a) wallung backward and trying to keep up with members of a 
team walking forward at a rapid and stressful pace, and (b) is walking blind into battle 
with total reliance on other team members to cover their assignments. 
One major difference between this type of entry and a S.W.A.T.-type entry is the 
rapid movement past un-cleared areas. S.W.A.T. operators are taught to pass areas 
they have not checked and cleared. An AST will move past everything until they 
encounter, confront, and stop the shooter because they are moving to the sound of the 
gunfire, or attack. 
What makes this group so effective is that they are constantly moving toward the 
actor or shooter. The group is directed either by updated intelligence from the command 
structure outside the building or by intelligence they have gathered on their own inside 
the building. Intelligence inside the building comes from various sources, such as from 
students or teachers or employees running away from the source of violence to save 
themselves, or from their own eyes, ears, and observations. Either way, the group's plan 
is to move to the violent actor, confront him, contain him, stop him, arrest him, or engage 
him in battle. There are basically three ways these situations end (a) suicide, (b) 
surrender, or (c) termination (Borelli, 2005). 
Problems with the New Tactics 
These tactics may seem simple when explained in lay terms. The police respond, 
assess the situation, and enter to stop the shooter. This sounds like an easy sell to police 
officers. However, some parts of these tactics are very difficult to train for. The most 
difficult aspect of this is to train the responding police officers that they must pass injured 
victims and walking wounded: step over or around them if necessary to meet their 
objective. 
Yes, pass and leave the wounded: walk right past injured teachers and students 
alike. The reason behind this unappealing and certainly unorthodox method of rescue is 
to put an end to the shooting quickly. The primary way to reduce the number of potential 
victims is to neutralize the shooter (Scanlon, 2001). One bright side to the new tactics is 
that the team will communicate the location of the injured and any other available 
information to the command post outside. The incident commander will decide to form a 
rescue team specifically to retrieve the wounded. 
If the inserted police officers who make up the ASTs get tied up with evacuation 
efforts, with trying to treat and rescue the injured occupants of the building or by 
searching rooms prior to passing, precious time is lost and the shooter is creating more 
victims (Scanlon, 2001). A school or workplace could house hundreds of potential 
victims. An effective use of the first responders is to install them into the area as 
"hunters": they must hunt the aggressor, pass by all others, and focus on their mission to 
stop the killing of innocent victims. 
Acting as hunters is a difficult concept to train to a group of people who have 
sworn to protect the citizens they serve. Most of a municipal police officer's job is 
service-related. Police respond to more medical calls then they do to crimes in progress. 
Police are accustomed to rendering first aid in a multitude of situations, from aid calls to 
car accidents to slip and falls. Medical treatment would come more naturally to most 
police officers than acting in a combat capacity. 
The thouglit process behind this seemingly violent transition between police 
officer and combatant is that people are dying waiting for you, the responding police 
officer, to stop the person[s] doing the killing. To accomplish this, police must act more 
like a military unit than a municipal police department. They must train to act fast and 
with a maximum level of violence in order to take control of a bad situation therefore 
saving lives (Giduck, 2005). Police have to be trained to think of these situations more as 
a battle ground than a crime scene (Giduck, 2005). During the heat of battle, the focus 
must be to stop the enemy by getting to and engaging the enemy quickly to end the 
conflict. 
The researcher acts as a trainer of these new tactics in a mid-sized municipal 
police agency and along with a partner and co-trainer, identifies those police officers in 
that agency who should never join the battle. Those that were identified should sooner be 
sent to where nothing violent is occurring rather than risk their incompetence getting 
brave police officers, willing to risk their own lives to save others, hurt or killed. These 
police officers either lack the requisite skills to be a part of an ad hoc tactical team or just 
cannot handle the stresses associated with this type of situation. Before the shooting 
starts, is the time to take a realistic inventory of what human and material resources are 
available to supervisors who will staff the command posts. 
School Resource Officer 
Many reports on the choice of a School Resource Officer (SRO) call for a 
rigorous selection process for those who will be assigned to the schools. It just so 
happens that these police officers are typically the first on scene at a school shooting 
incident (Fairburn & Grossman, 2000). These police officers are stationed at area 
schools and are positioned to be a vital part of a team inserted into a school. They should 
have the best knowledge of the layout of the school and may also be able to identify the 
actorlstudent doing the killing when only being provided with a name. 
An SRO needs to be able to switch into a combat mode at the drop of the hat 
because they have trained hard for this very type of situation. Let the teachers do the 
teaching at the schools and have the police do the policing. The job of the SRO should 
be to continuously be alert, prevent and react. In the absence of prevention they should 
be able to switch gears and react to be the front line in the battle, bringing the battle to the 
potential killer, whoever it may be (Fairbum & Grossman, 2000). 
To provide high quality protection for our children takes training and more 
training. The training requires time in the schools practicing for these very types of 
events. The training has to include planning for other aspects that go along with critical 
incident response, such as setting up perimeters, evacuation routes, staging areas for other 
responding services and the like. The agencies that fail to plan for this type of event to 
occur in their jurisdictions will have the most difficulty dealing with violence when it 
happens. And it could happen anywhere. 
One difficulty in training police is that all police executives are not sold on the 
costs and benefits of this training. Some police executives have been in policing for 
many years. Therefore, it is highly likely that they came into police work with a different 
mindset, one devoted to old-style policing where police responded and waited to secure 
the area. Justification for spending money on new equipment and training for their police 
departments when they had always relied on the local, regional or county S.W.A.T. team 
to handle tough situations may be difficult for them. The rationale behind this sentiment 
is that S.W.A.T. teams train for critical incidents, so let them handle it. It is their job. 
The problem with this mentality is the time that is lost while S.W.A.T. is responding 
cannot be reclaimed; as more time goes by more victims are likely to be injured or killed. 
As stated in chapter 1, every 15 seconds another victim is shot during an event of this 
kind (Tactical Response Staff, 2008) so time cannot be spent waiting. 
Research and Theory Related to 
Police Administrators 
There is an assumption among organization leaders and theorists that structure 
influences behavior (Ouchi, 1977). According to Mintzberg (1979) action planning 
specifies method and time frames for decisions and actions. Perrow (1986) described 
rules that govern conditions of work and specify standard processes for carrying out 
tasks, will help to ensure that similar situations are handled uniformly. Bolman and Deal 
(2003) stated several of their assumptions of the structural frame; organizations: achieve 
established goals and objectives; increase efficiency and enhance performance through 
specialization and division of labor; and coordination and control ensure diverse efforts 
of individuals and units mesh, through the use of structure. 
Mintzberg's (1979) theory of action planning is a clear fit for police preparedness 
because it accounts for how the job is done rather than specifically relying on the 
outcome of the operation. In the type of police operation at the foundation of this study, 
there will not always be positive results. Innocent people will lose their lives as police 
move to their target. The police may have to pass by injured people on their way to 
achieve their action plan. This tactical decision to save more lives by stopping the 
shooter rather than to save the lives of the already injured can be applied to the heart of 
Mintzberg's theory. The objective of success is more difficult to measure so it becomes 
necessary to assess how the job is done. When innocent people die, it is difficult to call a 
mission a success. However, using Mintzberg's action planning theory as a gauge, 
persons in a debriefing session could look at the result of the mission: If lives were saved 
by stopping the shooting was the mission a success? 
The theory of rules discussed by Perrow (1986) can also be applied to police 
training. This theory again allows for interoperability of police departments that 
normally do not work together. If all agencies are training in the same tactics then the 
likelihood of an operation that is jointly undertaken (interoperability) will be successful 
greatly increases. 
The theories that are a part of the foundation of the structural frame as discussed 
in Bolman and Deal (2003) lend themselves rather neatly to the field of policing. Police 
officers work under very structured conditions that are rule oriented. In the field of 
policing there is a very clear chain of command and the structure of police departments 
and their level of preparation will determine the outcome of the situations they face. 
The assumptions described by Bolman and Deal (2003) that people in 
organizations achieve established goals and objectives can be applied to police training 
because there must be a clear and concise plan established to determine what tactics will 
be taught. The assumption concerning increased efficiency and enhanced performance 
through specialization and division of labor (Bolman & Deal, 2003) applies to police 
training for critical-incident response in that specialization and division of labor allows 
police to train for specific tasks and excel in their performance. The more successful the 
police officer is at their assigned task the more likely the mission will result in success. 
To date, most research on school shootings has been conducted by psychologists 
who have focused on mental illnesses and problems of the offenders however; little 
attention has been paid to the social and cultural contexts of these incidents (Fox & 
Harding, 2005). Less attention has been paid to the law enforcement aspect of this 
problem. This researcher has found no studies focused on the best method for law 
enforcement officers to respond and deal with a school shooting. 
School Violence 
According to Currie (1985) many theories on juvenile violence were flawed because 
they were somehow separate from social policies, inequality, racism, unemployment and 
neglect. Currie called the failure to address these other issues the "fallacy of autonomy" 
(Currie, 1985, p. 185). 
In their general theory of crime, Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) stated that low self 
control in the pursuit of self interest causes crime. Their assumption is based on 
parenting deficiencies for those that are more likely to express themselves defiantly and 
in criminality. 
Organizational deviance occurs when events that are created by or in 
organizations do not conform to an organization's goals or expectations and produce 
unanticipated and harmful outcomes (Vaughan, 1999, p273). After a 2 year study, 
O'Toole (1999) concluded that no research exists that has identified traits and 
characteristics that can reliably distinguish school shooters from other students. 
O'Toole's (1999) study asserted that many studies of school shootings were based 
predominantly upon media accounts of the events. These accounts would often be flawed 
because the media did not enjoy access to confidential law enforcement and school files 
(O'Toole, 1999). O'Toole (1999) identified personality and behavioral traits that many 
school shooters possess; although O'Toole stressed that none of the traits should carry 
more weight than the other. O'Toole concluded the report with the recommendation that 
school and police administrators use threat assessment to thwart possible attacks. A 
threat was defined as an expression of intent to do harm or act out violently against some 
one or something. The threat can be oral, written or symbolic (O'Toole, 1999). 
The U.S. Secret Service (2002b) advocates responsible bystander behavior where 
students with knowledge of events or threats should inform responsible adults. This 
would allow for problems to be addressed before they end in potential school violence. 
Coordination and control help to ensure that diverse efforts of individuals and 
units mesh (Bolman & Deal, 2003). This theory is the premise behind having a unified 
response plan for police first responders to violent school incidents. Through the use of 
s t ~ c t u r e ,  police officers from various agencies are able to work safely and effectively 
together. 
Fox and Harding (2005) studied organizational deviance as a factor of school 
violence. According to Fox and Harding (2005) rampage school shootings fit Vaughan's 
definition of organizational deviance because the violence deviates from formal design 
goals and normative standards or expectations. 
Kurtz and Nofziger (2005) stated that using routine-activities theory and or a 
lifestyle model to study juvenile exposure to violence is a useful tool. In their study, data 
from a nationally representative sample demonstrates that routine-activity of lifestyles 
that expose juveniles to violence serve as and important risk factor for juveniles 
offending violently (Kurtz & Nofziger, 2005). However, Kurtz and Nofziger (2005) 
pointed out that many studies of juvenile violence tend to focus on friends, family and 
violent juveniles. The gap in the research appears to be that routine activities or lifestyle 
create a situation where the juvenile may be an innocent bystander to violent crime 
(Kurtz & Nofziger, 2005). Juveniles become at risk because of the violence they witness 
rather than the violence in which they are a participant. 
According to Gottfredson, Gottfredson, Gottfredson and Payne (2005) recent 
attempts to prevent serious violent crime in schools have been focused on identifying the 
characteristics of the offenders. The study had been undertaken to try to successfully 
identify potential shooters before they act (Gottfredson et al., 2005). A more accurate 
way to track school violence is to identify the schools with elevated crime rates and 
violent incidents (Gottfredson et al., 2005). The basis for this theory is that prior studies 
on school characteristics as predictors of deviant or violent behavior have shown that 
community characteristics, school structural characteristics along with variables outside 
of the control of school administrators are effective predictors of the level of disorder in 
schools (Gottfredson et al, 2005). 
Optimistic bias (Chapin & Coleman, 2006; Weinstein, 1980) refers to the 
perception that bad things happen to other people. Reduction of optimistic bias in regard 
to school violence is an important step in creating an understanding in students' personal 
risks, getting them to take threats seriously and taking self-protective measures (Chapin 
& Coleman, 2006). The Chapin and Coleman (2006) study was the first study of 
optimistic bias in the context of school violence. Other studies have used optimistic bias 
to study violence in the context of violence against women and child abuse (Chapin & 
Coleman, 2006). The validity of direct application of results the study may be 
questionable in that it was conducted on a small scale in one county in Pennsylvania. 
Policy recommendation for both police and school administrators may require the study 
to be replicated on a larger scale. 
Routine-activities theory (Kautt & Roncek, 2007) revealed that schools can be 
criminal hotspots. The theory states that schools are likely locations for violence and 
criminal activity due to the familiarity of the location to the juvenile actors. 
Pies (2007) called for a "distant early warning" system of indicators to identify 
troubled students. This can only be done when the full resources of doctors, parents, 
schools, and communities are combined to reduce the plague of violence in our culture 
(Pies, 2007). 
This information is equally as important to school administrators as it is to police 
administrators that are trying to understand violence in schools. School administrators 
can work toward intervention strategies when armed with knowledge of what types of 
students have the potential to he violent and from what set of circumstances they come 
from. This is not a be all and end all. There is no crystal ball to predict the future acts of 
school violence. School administrators can work toward putting measures in place when 
they become aware of students that may be in crisis mode as defined by the numerous 
theories previously discussed. The true benefit of a mutual knowledge shared by both 
police and school administrators is that information can be shared in a symbiotic 
relationship to ensure a safer learning environment for all students. 
Theoretical Framework 
To establish a strong relationship between the number of police officers trained to 
provide active-shooter training to other police officers and the frequency of training 
police are doing to be better prepared to respond to active-shooter situations in the 
schools and the variables that may have an effect on the training, consideration should be 
given to theory and research in the field of study. Theories of organizational structures, 
goals, and planning are part of the theoretical framework for the present study. 
Organizations are designed to achieve established goals and objectives; increase 
efficiency and enhance performance through specialization and division of labor; and 
coordination and control ensure diverse efforts of individuals and units mesh, through the 
use of structure (Bolman & Deal, 2003). Therefore, when police agencies establish a 
structured environment where training, planning and goal setting are stressed the result is 
better preparation for critical incident response. 
At the foundation of the present study is the Standardization of Patrol Based 
Response to Active-Shooter Situations. In this standardization policy, the appropriate 
response strategy involves immediate action and quick deployment by patrol forces to 
stop deadly actions of criminal actor[s]. For police to delay deployment under these 
circumstances may result in additional death or serious injuries (BCPO, 2005). 
Summary 
Parents and citizens are entitled to have their police agencies, at the municipal, 
county, state and federal levels make adaptations to do more to enhance their quality of 
life. To accomplish this, these agencies must work hard to prepare for events that have 
become all too common in our society. School violence, work place shootings and 
potential terrorist activity on US soil is now more than ever a reality. 
School safety training and critical-incident drills have become mandated in New 
Jersey and other states. As much as had been done to prevent fire deaths in schools, 
needs to be done to prevent death at the hands of a violent adult or student in a school. 
With fire sprinklers and alarms in every school, and fire drills and evacuation routes 
preplanned, the likelihood of a student dying in a fire in a school in the US is minimal at 
best. In fact, no child has died in a fire in the last 25 years in an American school. 
However in the school year 2004/2005,48 people were killed at the hands of a violent 
aggressor in schools (Fairbum & Grossman, 2000). 
Training and safety have a long way to go toward prevention of these types of 
incidents. In the mean time there has to be more done for police to be able to effectively 
minimize the causalities in our nation's schools. School adrmnistrators are more alert and 
aware of potential problem students. Schools are being equipped with surveillance 
devices to protect the potential victims contained therein. More needs to be done to 
prepare for the most likely threat that may come to those in the building. To prepare for 
the violent people who are allowed access to the facility. 
This has to come from the police and their stepped up efforts of training and 
planning for potential attack. With the initiation of tactics such as active-shooter training 
and all of its kind, there needs to be a follow through. This will come at the hands of 
forward thinking police executives that realize that there is a need for getting their 
officers into schools to become more familiar with the interior layouts of the buildings. 
Executives that understand that the officers that are assigned to schools in the capacity of 
the SRO, are truly the best qualified to thwart or fend off an attack on the school. Police 
executives must understand that the time of setting up and waiting for S.W.A.T. is no 
longer an option. They need to realize that all of their police officers must be tactically 
trained to be able to make a difference. They need to act in spite of any lack of help by 
school administrators. 
In 2004, a Columbus, Ohio police officer had stopped a deadly attack at a night 
club concert. A gunman had entered the club and killed a band member on stage while 
he was performing. An alert police officer trained in QUAD, (the Ohio version of active- 
shooter training) entered the night club, encountered the suspect and shot him dead, 
stopping the shooter's deadly assault before any more lives had been taken (Marx & 
Mayhood). 
In 2005 in Red Lake, Minnesota a 16 year old student killed a grandparent and the 
grandparent's companion. The student went to his high school and shot a teacher, a 
security guard, and five other students before killing himself. The Red Lake Police 
Department had prepared for an event like this and trained for it at the school. They 
relied on their training and made immediate entry into the school (School Violence 
Resource Center, 2007). Their response time and school entry was 2 minutes. The police 
officers found, confronted, shot, and wounded the violent student who then retreated into 
a classroom and killed himself (Freed, 2005). Their training had paid off. Although 
innocent lives had been lost, many more people could have been killed without the 
immediate response by the police. 
These two incidents have shown that rapid police response to a scene and 
immediate police action will save lives. Violence can happen anywhere and if the police 
have not prepared for it there is the potential for many lives to be lost. 
This researcher believes plans need to be developed now for all facets of these 
critical incidents. Road closure plans, staging areas, triage locations, debriefing sites, 
contact lists and the like. During the mayhem of these encounters there is too much to do 
to just wing it. Responses may need to be to a degree scripted to get as much essential 
work done with a minimum level of thinking about the various contacts that may need to 
be made. If a response plan exists some things on scene can become automatic and more 
attention can be focused on other areas of concern that may need more attention. 
Chapter I1 has presented a review of pertinent literature, research and theory 
which contained; an introduction, background, a historical summary of events, traditional 
police tactics, legal mandates for change, new police tactics, problems with the new 
tactics, related research and theory to police administrators, school violence, a theoretical 
framework, and a summary. Chapter 111 will include a description of the design and 
methods of the study by discussing; purpose, design, population, methods, 
instrumentation, and a conclusion. 
Chapter I11 
DESIGN AND METHODS 
Purpose 
This chapter provides an overview of purpose, design, methods, population, 
instrumentation, and conclusion. The purpose for this study was to explore the influence 
that the Bergen County Prosecutor's Office Directive 05-01 had on the training and 
future preparations of all sworn police officers in Bergen County, New Jersey in response 
to active-shooter situations in the schools of their jurisdictions. Because attendance in 
schools is mandatory for the children of Bergen County, New Jersey it becomes 
imperative that the municipal police departments of the county are able to provide a safe 
learning environment while children are in attendance. Bergen County has 68 municipal 
police departments that were included as participants in the study. The researcher 
obtained a complete list of municipal police departments in Bergen County on the Bergen 
County Prosecutor's Office website, www.bcpo.net, then added the number of police 
officers employed by each municipality with information derived from the FBI's 2006 
Uniform Crime Report, New Jersey full-time law enforcement employees (see Appendix 
B). 
The researcher was guided by the following questions: 
Question 1. How have training efforts changed for police preparedness in responding 
to active-shooter situations in schools to create a safer learning environment for children 
since the September 1,2005 training mandate issued by the Bergen County b rose cut or's 
Office? (a) How are training efforts exposing officers to realistic environments? (b) 
How have police departments augmented response capabilities on the topic? 
Question 2. Why are police departments implementing or not implementing the 
Standardization of Patrol Based Response to Active-Shooter Situations model 
policy? 
Question 3. What factors account for the variability in the number of police officers 
designated to train others in active-shooter response and the frequency of training being 
done in police departments in active-shooter preparation in schools? 
Because there is relatively little research in the field of police tactics and only 
some theory, most of which is concerned with the psychological characteristics of the 
actor[s], the researcher relied heavily on related literature and the descriptions of prior 
events. The study of law enforcement tactics and strategy is in its relative infancy and 
only now has begun to be seriously studied and therefore, there is a lack of information 
available on police training (O'Brien, 2008a). The importance of this study is based in 
the knowledge of "those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it" 
(Santayana, 1905, p. 13). 
Design 
A survey instrument was assembled to gather information in several topic areas: 
descriptive information, personnel, operations, specialized units, emergency preparedness 
for Active-Shooter 1 Critical Incident response, equipment, and policies and procedures. 
Six of the eight sections of the United States Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice 
Statistics Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics (LEMAS) survey 
were borrowed with permission (see Appendix C). The survey instrument then 
comprised of 58 questions which were assembled to gather descriptive information. A 
total of 51 questions were borrowed from the LEMAS survey instrument and 7 original 
questions designed by the researcher. Permission was granted via telephonic and email 
contact with Dr. Brian Reaves, the lead statistical administrator of the survey for the 
Bureau of Justice Statistics. Specifically, Dr. Reaves stated in an email correspondence 
that permission was granted to use certain questions from the original LEMAS survey 
tool. The original survey instrument was not a copy-written document and was therefore 
public domain. However, a request was made from Dr. Reaves that the Bureau of 
Justice Statistics not be mentioned in the new survey instrument: a request which was 
honored by the researcher. 
A pilot study was then conducted to determine face validity of the survey 
instrument. Some comments received from the respondents of the pilot study included 
that the survey was lengthy and time consuming. See the instrumentation section of this 
chapter for more information on the results of the pilot study and specific comments 
made by the participants for the revision of the survey instrument. 
As a result of the feedback generously provided by the participants of the pilot 
study of this project, a total of four questions were used from the original LEMAS survey 
instrument. Questions originally designed to gather information about the number of 
full time police officers working for a law enforcement agency, total dollar amount in 
operating budget of the agency, total dollar amount in seized funds made by the agency, 
and total calls for service responded to by the agency. All questions were based on the 
2007 calendar year, the last complete year of operation of the agency prior to this study 
taking place. After further review of the research tool, the researcher realized the survey 
tool distributed in the pilot study gathered a large amount of information that shared little 
relevance to this research project. Several of the topic areas previously mentioned were 
deleted to comply with the suggestions of the participants of the pilot study. 
The remaining eight questions included in the revised survey instrument for this 
research project were developed by the researcher in conjunction with a jury of experts. 
The final survey instrument used in this study comprised of 11 questions (see Appendix 
D). These questions were specifically tailored to provide answers to the guiding 
questions of this research project. 
The present study is a type 2 design, that Johnson (2001) calls a cross-sectional, 
descriptive study. It is cross-sectional because the data are collected from participants at 
a single point in time. According to Johnson (2001), if the researcher is describing 
phenomenon and documenting the characteristics of phenomenon then the study is 
descriptive non-experimental research. The data directly apply to each case at a single 
time and comparisons are made across the variables of interest (Johnson, 2001, p. 9). 
The present study sought to answer the following questions: 
Question 1. How have training efforts changed for police preparedness in responding 
to active-shooter situations in schools to create a safer learning environment for children 
since the September 1,2005 training mandate issued by the Bergen County Prosecutor's 
Office? (a) How are training efforts exposing officers to realistic environments? (b) 
How have police departments augmented response capabilities on the topic? Question 2. 
Why are police departments implementing or not implementing the Standardization of 
Patrol Based Response to Active-Shooter Situations model policy? Question 3. What 
factors account for the variability in the number of police officers designated to train 
others in active-shooter response and the frequency of training being done in police 
departments in active-shooter preparation in schools? 
This study can be described as a cross-sectional descriptive non-experimental 
research by the use of the Johnson (2001) descriptions. According to Witte and Witte 
(2004) the present study collected qualitative data because when a single observation is a 
word or a code that is representative of a class or category, the data are qualitative. Witte 
and Witte (2004) also suggest that descriptive statistics such as tables, graphs and 
averages can be used to organize and summarize information about a collection of 
observations. The researcher proposed to use descriptive statistical methods to address 
guiding questions one and two of this project. Through the use of frequency distributions 
the researcher addressed the data gathered from the survey instrument to answer the 
guiding questions. 
To answer guiding question 3 the researcher used the Chi-Squared (@) statistical 
method. Analyses were then conducted to determine what relationship the independent 
or predictor variables (total budget, total dollar amount of seized funds, number of sworn 
law enforcement officers, and total calls for service each from the calendar year 2007) 
had on each of the two dependant variables (the number of police officers designated to 
train others in active-shooter response and the frequency of training being conducted). 
Methods 
This study relied solely on self reported data by agents of police departments. 
According to Kerlinger (1986) "It can even be said that non-experimental research is 
more important than experimental research.. ." (p. 359). Gall, Borg, and Gall (1996) 
stated causal -comparative methods are the easiest quantitative approach to looking into 
cause and effect relationships between phenomena. One of the objectives of this study 
was to find which of the independent variables discovered in the survey instrument had 
the most effect on the type and frequency of training being done in municipal police 
departments of Bergen County. Because all of the 68 municipal police departments in 
the county were included in the study it was considered a census. The researcher 
proposed to have all 68 of the municipal police departments existing in Bergen County, 
NJ participate in the study. A letter asking for permission to send each of the police 
agencies a survey was sent to the Bergen County Prosecutor's Office. The researcher 
received a letter from the prosecutor's office granting permission to send the survey to 
the municipal police agencies (see Appendix C). In the permission letter was a request 
for the researcher to share the findings of this project with the prosecutor's office. 
Furthermore, in a follow up phone conversation the researcher had with First Assistant 
Prosecutor William Galda, it was made known that this research project stimulated 
interest in a topic that had been put aside for a period while other important topics were 
being handled. The project sewed as a catalyst for the prosecutor's office to look into all 
the policies that municipal police agencies had submitted since the distribution of the 
training memo at the foundation of this study. This leads the researcher to conclude that 
prior to any data collection this research project has been a useful tool in reigniting 
interest in an area that may have been forgotten. 
The rationale for soliciting participation from each of the municipal police 
departments in the county is in the similarities and differences of the police departments. 
Responses to the survey instrument from police departments of varying staffing levels, 
economic prowess, and setting (urban 1 suburban) will paint a more accurate picture of 
what training is occurring within the county in the realm of active-shooter response. The 
primary objective of this study was to determine what influence the Bergen County 
Prosecutor's Office Directive 05-01 had on the training and future preparations of all 
sworn police officers in Bergen County, New Jersey in response to active-shooter 
situations in their jurisdictions. Each identified municipal police department in the 
county was sent a survey instrument (N=68) along with completion instructions and a 
cover letter requesting the Chief of Police, civilian Police Director or their designee 
complete and return the survey to the researcher. 
The final survey instrument comprised of 11 fact based questions was sent to a 
jury of experts in the field. The experts agreed that the survey was easy to understand, 
easy to complete, and took very little time to locate the information to answer the 
questions. The original questions borrowed from the LEMAS survey come with a 
reported 90% reliability estimate as provided by the lead statistician for the survey, Dr. 
Reaves of the Bureau of Justice Statistics. The LEMAS survey is distributed to police 
agencies across the United States every three years and has been determined to be both a 
valid and reliable tool. 
All information being requested by the survey is accessible to the researcher 
through the Open Public Records Act (OPRA), however it is the contention of the 
researcher that in the form of a survey instrument the most current and accurate data will 
be collected which will make the resulting information more timely and relevant. If the 
researcher were to request all information being sought in this study through OPRA the 
information gathered may not be the most current as record updating is not a daily 
occurrence in governmental agencies, and this process would add a significant amount of 
time to the project as well. 
Once the voluntary participant police agencies return the surveys to the researcher 
a Cronbach's Alpha test will be conducted to determine a reliability coefficient. 
Cronbach's Alpha is a test reliability technique to provide a unique estimate of the 
reliability for a given test (Gliem & Gliem, 2003). This will be reported in more detail in 
chapter IV. 
Prior to mailing the surveys, they will be coded with a control number known 
only to the researcher to track the responses as they are returned. No questions will be 
asked to specifically identify any agency based on the responses provided by the 
participants. No personal or identifying information will be asked of the person or 
representative of the police agency that has completed the survey. This is another layer 
of anonymity built in to the present study. All surveys as they are returned to the 
researcher will be stored in a locked fire resistant safe in the home of the researcher to 
maintain the security of the data. This information will be maintained for a period of no 
less than three years. The survey is also completely voluntary in nature. The study was 
approved by the Seton Hall University Institutional Review board on December 17,2008 
(see Appendix C). 
Population 
All of the police agencies used in this study are located in Bergen County, NJ, and 
each falls under the direction of the Bergen County Prosecutor's office jurisdiction. 
There are a total of 68 municipal police departments included in the study. Some of the 
distinctions of the police agencies are: number of sworn officers, square mileage 
patrolled by the agency, equipment, and specialized services available by the agency. 
Police departments were approved to participate in this study through a permission letter 
approved by the Bergen County Prosecutor, John L. Molinelli. Police departments were 
then sent a cover letter with an explanation of the study and survey instrument to 
complete and return to the researcher. 
Instrumentation 
The LEMAS survey instrument was adapted to the specific needs of this research 
project. Wording of selected questions was changed to reflect the timeframe under study. 
Section V community policing and section VI emergency preparedness which is specific 
to terrorist activity were not used. A new section V with original questions formulated by 
the researcher along with a jury of experts in the field of policing, emergency 
management, and tactics was substituted to help the researcher answer the guiding 
questions of this research project. The researcher developed questions which replaced 
the original section V of the study and sent them electronically to Dr. David Klinger of 
the Criminology and Criminal Justice Department of The University of Missouri - St. 
Louis; Dr. Stephen Hoptay, Lieutenant with the New Jersey State Police, Office of 
Emergency Management, Special Operations Section; Dr. Daniel Simone, Captain with 
the Hohoken (NJ) Police Department; Sergeant David Champerlain of the Modesto (CA) 
Police Department, Special Victims Unit; and John Gnagey, Executive Director of the 
National Tactical Officers Association (NTOA) for feedback. With feedback and expert 
advice from the aforementioned experts in the field, questions were developed and 
accepted for use in the study. 
A pilot study was then conducted on August 1,2008 with the survey instrument in 
three municipalities in New Jersey that are in neighhoring counties to Bergen; Morris and 
Passaic. In Passaic County the researcher contacted Chief Joseph Borell of the 
Bloomingdale Police Department, and Lt. Paul Dring of the Wayne Police Department. 
In Morris County the researcher contacted Chief Brian Spring of the Pequannock Police 
Department. The aforementioned police departments were selected for the pilot study for 
two reasons; (a) they are in neighhoring counties to Bergen, (b) they are a representative 
sample of the number of police officers in municipal police departments in Bergen 
County. The Bloomingdale Police Department has 16 full-time police officers, 
Pequannock has 30, and Wayne has 116. These numbers are very similar to the Bergen 
County staffing levels for small, medium and larger sized agencies listed in the 2006 FBI 
Uniform Crime Report (FBI, 2006). 
Each of these police administrators was provided with the survey instrument and 
asked to complete it using the attached directions. They were then asked to contact the 
researcher via email as soon as it was completed to provide constructive feedback and 
make any necessary revisions or recommendations to make the survey instrument 
stronger. The pilot study was conducted from August 1,2008 to August 6,2008. 
Chief Borell suggested that the overall appearance of the survey seemed a bit 
cluttered and lengthy. Once the Chief began to work on the study, the cluttered feeling 
disappeared and the ease of the survey questions became apparent. A comment was 
forwarded that the survey seemed a bit too long, with 58 total questions. The Chief stated 
the survey instrument was well written and it was clear to the reader what was being 
asked. Chief Borell stated the survey took an estimated 45 to 50 minutes to complete. 
Chief Borell suggested shortening the survey to include only the information that was 
most necessary for the study. With a completion time estimated at approximately 60 
minutes, the survey taker may lose interest. Chief Borell made one last comment that was 
especially important; the survey should be completed by an agency head. The necessity 
of this was born out the type of information being sought, that is budget items, training 
hours, and salaries. 
Lt. Dring also suggested the survey be completed by a member of the police 
department's administrative staff, in the Lieutenant's words, "upper command staff'. 
The Lieutenant cited some of same the reasons Chief Borell did for this need. Lt. Dring 
stated the survey took approximately 60 to 90 minutes to complete which was even 
longer than the time taken by Chief Borell. This estimation was closer to the latter due to 
malung several in-house phone calls to gather information that was not immediately 
available to the Lieutenant. Lt. Dring also recommended the survey be shortened to 
maintain the interest of the participant. 
Chief Spring estimated the completion time for the survey at about 90 minutes. 
This was consistent with the prior two responses. Chief Spring did not feel as though any 
one question was too difficult to answer, and that they were all very clear in what they 
were asking. Chief Spring's final comment about the questionnaire was that no revisions 
were necessary and all of the questions were clear, concise and relevant but the survey 
took a substantial amount of time to complete. 
The time to complete the survey was estimated at approximately 60 to 90 minutes 
by each of the pilot study participants. This was a duration which seemed to be too long 
for each of the participants. Each participant in the pilot study did recommend that an 
upper level or command staff member such as the Chief or top administrator complete the 
survey as they would have the easiest access to the information requested. The result of 
the pilot test was that significant revisions were made. 
The survey was pared down from 58 questions to 11 in total. The 11 total 
questions were those that would specifically be used to answer the guiding questions of 
this research project. The new survey instrument was then sent to four new participants 
that agreed to answer the survey and provide feedback. The information gathered from 
the new participants, all administrative level police officers; was that the survey was well 
written, the questions were clear and concise, the survey took about 10 to 15 minutes to 
complete, and the survey should not be an imposition on a police administrator to 
participate in the study due to the ease of the completion of the survey instrument. 
The final survey instrument coded with a control number was mailed along with a 
cover letter of explanation, and a self addressed stamped envelope to facilitate a more 
likely return mailing of the completed survey to the researcher. The researcher mailed 
the surveys on December 18,2008 and asked the participants to return the 1 1  question 
survey by January 7,2009. The researcher allowed a third week for any late mailings 
before beginning any statistical processes. 
By using frequency distributions the researcher will demonstrate to the reader; 
how many police departments in Bergen County, NJ had an active-shooter response plan 
in effect prior the training mandate established by the county prosecutor's office, how 
many agencies share radio interoperability with neighboring and bordering jurisdictions 
since the training mandate, which kinds of equipment purchases were made by police 
departments to facilitate forced entry into structures since the mandate, what kind of 
training is being done to practice for a future active-shooter event, how many officers 
have been trained to instruct other police officers in this type of response tactics, how 
often police are training for these kinds of events, how many police departments have 
adopted the model policy distributed by the county prosecutor's office or created their 
own policy and why. Then the information collected on the number of sworn police 
officers, total budget, total in seized funds, and number of calls for service will be used as 
variables in a Chi-square ( ~ 2 )  statistical analysis to see which has the most influence on 
the number of police officers designated to train others in active-shooter response and the 
frequency of training being done in police departments in active-shooter preparation in 
schools in Bergen County, NJ. 
Conclusion 
In Chapter 111 the researcher described the design and methods of the study by 
discussing; purpose, design, population, methods, and instrumentation. Chapter IV will 
present the collected data along with an analysis of the data collected by using frequency 
distributions and Chi-square ( ~ 2 )  statistical analyses to determine which variables have 
the most influence on Active-Shooter preparation being done by police departments in 
Bergen County, NJ. 
Chapter IV 
PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS OF THE DATA 
Introduction 
The researchers' purpose for conducting thls non-experimental study was to 
investigate the influence that the Bergen County Prosecutor's Office Directive 05-01 had 
on the training and future preparations of all sworn police officers in Bergen County, 
New Jersey in response to active-shooter situations in the schools of their jurisdictions. 
The investigation was narrowly focused on answering the following guiding questions: 
Question 1. How have training efforts changed for police preparedness in responding 
to active-shooter situations in schools to create a safer learning environment for children 
since the September 1,2005 training mandate issued by the Bergen County Prosecutor's 
Office? (a) How are training efforts exposing officers to realistic environments? @) 
How have police departments augmented response capabilities on the topic? Question 2. 
Why are police departments implementing or not implementing the Standardization of 
Patrol Based Response to Active-Shooter Situations model policy? Question 3. What 
factors account for the variability in the number of police officers designated to train 
others in active-shooter response and the frequency of training being done in police 
departments in active-shooter preparation in schools? 
Collection of Data 
Table 1 provides a list of events complied by the researcher that were carried out 
or planned to occur in schools across the country (in 30 of the 50 states) since the attack 
at Columbine High School in April 1999. Each item in Table 1 required a police 
response to a private residence or school, either to thwart an attack in progress or to 
intervene in the implementation of a planned attack. A review of Table 1 shows the 
absence of absolutes in the events. It is important to note that "those who cannot 
remember the past are condemned to repeat it" (Santayana, 1905, p. 13). Therefore, 
similar events need to be positioned together to be able to form a complete picture of 
what could happen at any time. 
Although the events were primarily staged and carried out by males, the example 
which occurred on October 4, 2002 in San Antonio, TX, describes a female actor. Most 
attacks occurred inside schools in hallways, classrooms, gymnasiums, and bathrooms; 
however, some occurred outside of the schools on the grounds and in parking lots. The 
events took place in urban, suburban and rural settings across all socio-economic strata. 
Victims were teachers, students and sometimes bystanders, both male and female. Actors 
in the events ranged from children (6 years old) to adults. 
For this study, a survey instrument was developed with the assistance of a jury of 
experts in the field of law enforcement. The survey was revised through a continuous 
flow of back and forth dialogue between the researcher and the jury of experts until a 
final version was selected. This process was discussed in greater detail in Chapter 111. 
This final survey instrument, consisting of 11 questions, was then distributed as a 
pilot study for feedback. After the determination that the final 1 1  question survey was to 
be distributed to the target population (N = 68), it was mailed with permission from the 
Bergen County Prosecutor's Office to all of the municipal police departments in Bergen 
County, NJ. The mailings took place on December 18,2008 and in the attached letter of 
solicitation it was requested that the voluntary participants return the survey to the 
researcher by January 7,2009 (see Appendix E). The researcher then allowed for another 
7 days for returns to account for the large volume of mail during the holiday season. 
In total 68 surveys were mailed on December 18,2008, one to each of the 68 
municipal police departments in Bergen County as listed on the Bergen County 
Prosecutor's Office website, www.bcpo.net. On the January 14,2009 cut off date for 
returned surveys, 46 surveys were returned to the researcher resulting in a return rate of 
68%. Of the 46 returned surveys, 1 was returned with all of the questions crossed out and 
no responses selected with a notation added which read "This causes me concerns on 
security issues." Therefore, all descriptive statistics and analyses are based on 45 returns 
(N = 45). 
Data and Findings 
Descriptive Statistics 
Survey question l a  was designed to learn if, prior to the September 1,2005 
mandate issued by the Bergen County Prosecutor's Office for active-shooter response 
training, police agencies had a written plan that specified actions to be taken in the event 
of an active-shooter in a school. Table 3 indicates that slightly more than half of the 
responding police agencies did not have a written plan which specified response actions 
to an active-shooter situation in a school of their jurisdiction. Therefore, a mandate to 
either develop their own plan or adopt the response plan as distributed was a step in the 
right direction toward getting police departments in the country to plan for this type of 
critical incident response. 
Table 3 
Bergen County Police Departments with Response Plan Prior to Prosecutor's Office 
Training Mandate of September 1,2005 
Response n % 
Yes 21 46.7 
No 24 53.3 
Total 45 (N) 100. 
Survey question ib  provided information on the number of police departments 
(21) that indicated they did have a written response plan, and had a mutual aid or 
cooperative agreement between neighboring and or geographically bordering 
jurisdictions. Table 4 shows that of the 21 police departments that indicated they already 
had a response plan prior to the prosecutor's office mandate, 18 had an agreement with 
neighboring police departments for mutual aid responses. These results showed that 
administrators in police departments that did develop a response plan saw the need to 
work cooperatively with neighboring departments. 
Table 4 
Bergen County Police Departments with Existing Response Plans that have Mutual Aid 
Agreements for Joint Responses 
Response n % 
Yes 18 86. 
No 3 14. 
Total 2 1 100. 
- 
Survey question 2 was developed to find out if respondents had, after the 
September 1,2005 training mandate, radio communications interoperability with 
geographically bordering jurisdictions. Table 5 shows that of the 43 responses to 
question number 2,40 police departments did have radio communication interoperability 
with geographically bordering jurisdictions. This is another success of the distributed 
response model policy. The response model policy created awareness for radio 
communications interoperability between agencies that will respond to a crisis together. 
Table 5 
Radio Communications Interoperability Between Neighboring Police Jurisdictions in 
Bergen County following Active-Shooter Planning 
Response n 9% 
Yes 40 93. 
No 3 7. 
Total 43 100. 
Survey question 3 was created to find out what types of tactical response gear the 
police departments of Bergen County either purchased or acquired since the September 1, 
2005 mandate. Table 6 indicates the types of response gear and the number of police 
departments reporting they acquired the respective items. The table shows that ballistic 
shields and carbine or patrol rifles were acquired more than other response gear items. 
Table 6 
Tactical Response Gear Acquired after Training Mandate of September 1, 2005 (N = 45) 
Gear Item Police Departments that Acquired Gear 
n % 
Ballistic Helmets 34 76. 
Ballistic Shields 42 93. 
Battering Rams 19 42. 
Bolt Cutters 29 64. 
Carbine or Patrol Rifles 36 80. 
Hallagan or Pry Bars 32 71. 
Sledge Hammers 24 53. 
Survey question 4 provided information on the types of training activities the 
respondent police departments participated in to prepare their officers better to respond to 
an active-shooter event in a school in their jurisdiction. Table 7 displays which types of 
training exercises and the number of agencies that participated in those exercises. The 
table includes percentages of Bergen County municipal police departments that 
participated at least once in each training category (multiple choices were possible). Of 
the various types of training listed, 39 police departments (87%) participated in active- 
shooter training in empty schools. This training is helpful for familiarization with 
response tactics and acclimation to the interior of schools. When police officers become 
familiar with the areas they may need to respond to in a crisis situation they may perform 
better under stressful conditions in those settings. The number of responses shows that, 
on average, responding police departments participated in 2.8 types of training. 
Table 7 
Training Exercises Participated in by Bergen County Police Departments for Active- 
Shooter Training (N = 45) Multiple Choices Possible. 
Type of Training Number of Police Departments 
n % 
Table TOD 15 33. 
~ u l t i - ~ e ' p t .  Table Top 9 
Training in Empty School 39 
Training in School wl Actors 24 
Multi-Dept. Training in Empty School 26 
Multi-Dept. Training in School w/ Actors 15 
Survey question 5 was created to learn from the responding police department 
administrators, the number of police officers in their agencies who were trained to train 
other police officers in active-shooter response. Table 8 reports the frequency 
distribution of responses. Question 5 responses were then statistically collapsed into 
logical groupings for later statistical analysis. The collapse was done using natural and 
logical break points. 
Number of Officers Trained to Train Other Police Officers in Active-Shooter Response 
Number of Officers Trained n % 
0 2 4.4 
1 1 2.3 
2 16 35.5 
3 13 28.8 
4 8 17.7 
5 2 4.4 
6 1 2.3 
7 1 2.3 
20 1 2.3 
Totals 45 (N) 100. 
Table 9 displays the recoded data from survey question 5. Data recoding was 
done to logically develop the groupings into a low number of officers trained (0-2 
officers), a medium number of officers trained (3 officers), and a high number of officers 
trained (more than 3 officers) to train other police officers in active-shooter response. 
- --- 
Table 9 
Recoded responses: Police Departments Reporting the Number of Officers Trained to 
Train Other Police Officers in Active-Shooter Response 
Officers Trained n % 
Low Number of Officers Trained 
(0-2 Officers) 19 42. 
Medium Number of Officers Trained 
(3 Officers) 
Hi& Number of Officers Trained 13 29. 
Total 45 (N) 100. 
Table 8 shows one outlier police agency that reported 20 police officers trained to 
train other police officers, otherwise the scale of responses ranged from 0-7. Of the 45 
police department administrators who responded to this question 29 (or 64%) reported 
that their agencies had either 2 or 3 officers trained to train other police officers in the 
active-shooter response tactics. 
Survey question 6 was created to learn how often police administrators, since the 
September 1,2005 training mandate, required their police officers to participate in 
training for active-shooter response whether it was practice scenarios, table-top exercises 
or roll-call discussions. These responses too were reported as frequencies then recoded 
and re-reported in statistically collapsed groups for later statistical analyses. These 
groups were also created using natural and logical break off points. Table 10 shows the 
frequency distribution of responses to the amount of training that is being done for 
municipal police departments in Bergen County, NJ. As indicated in Table 10, of the 45 
police department administrators that answered this survey question, 29 answered that 
they required their officers to participate in training either bi-annually or yearly. 
Table 10 
Frequency of Active-Shooter Training Required at Police Departments in Bergen County 
Training Frequency Agencies Reporting (n) % 
Monthly 
Quarterly 
Bi-annually 
Yearly 
Never 
Total 45 (N) 100. 
Shown below, Table 1 I reports the recoded responses from survey question 6 
reported in Table 10. These responses were later used for statistical analyses. 
Table 1 1. 
Recoded responses, Amount of Required Training by Bergen County Police Departments 
Training Frequency Agencies Reporting (n) % 
Once a Quarter or Monthly 
Bi-annually 
Once a Year or Never 
Total 
Survey question 7a provided information on whether or not police departments 
had adopted the Bergen County Prosecutor's Office (BCPO) Standardization of Patrol 
Based Response to Active-Shooter Situations model policy and the reasons which led to 
the adoption. Table 12 lists the responses provided by agencies that did adopt the model 
policy. 
Reoccurring themes developed from the responses provided for why agencies did 
adopt the model policy were either standardization, or having all police officers in the 
county being trained in the same tactics. Table 13 displays (question 7h responses) the 
reasons police administrators indicated why they did nor elect to implement the BCPO 
policy as written. 
Table 12 
(7a) Responses: Reasons Provided by Agencies for Adopting the BCPO Model Policy 
Res~onses n 
Response checked but no comment added 
Added agency specific material 
Adopted their policies and created additional policies 
All 
All officers on same page 
Allowed numerous agencies to utilize the response procedures with generic 
roles for each officer 
Already studied and used 
Bergen County Prosecutor's Office (BCPO) policy was sufficient for our needs 
Consistency through out area agencies 
Everyone then operates the same 
Felt BCPO policy worked best for our agency 
Good S.O.P. 
Helped develop the plan 
It was deemed sufficient and appropriate 
It was our intent to remain consistent with the agencies in Bergen County 
It was very similar to our original policy and would prevent conflict 
Policy fit our needs and was crafted by Bergen County Police Chiefs Association 
Policy was a good fit for our department 
Presumably much time and effort and input was acquired to make the policy one 
of the best possible 
Standard through the county 
Standardization 
Standardization with other agencies we would expect to work with 
Standardized policy with contiguous police departments 
The model policy allows us to be on same page as surrounding departments 
The policy fit our requirements with minor modifications 
To best conform with BCPO 
To conform to standardized countywide training, realizing mutual aid would be 
necessary 
To maintain uniformity with surrounding jurisdictions and county police 
Took model and modified it to meet needs of our jurisdiction 
We have the same training and procedures of the other agencies responding 
We will provide the minimum mandated training to comply with the BCPO 
directives 
Total 32 
Table 13 
(7b) Responses: Reasons Provided by Agencies for not Adopting the BCPO Model Policy 
Responses n 
Response checked but no comment listed 
BCPO policy allows for 3 person teams, we mandate minimum of 4 person teams 
BCPO policy and added National Tactical Officers Assoc. (NTOA) techniques 
Created from other agencies models but similar to BCPO policy 
Formulated to borough schools, used several parts of BCPO policy 
Had a similar policy in place 
Had standard NTOA policy in effect prior to BCPO policy 
In effect prior to BCPO mandate, covers all relevant training equipment etc.. . 
To better our own immediate needs 
To conform to the department size and availability 
Total 10 
Although the responses in Table 13 were provided as reasons why agencies did not adopt 
the model policy, most respondents indicated their original policy was as least similar to 
the BCPO model policy or they used parts of the model policy to form their own. 
Survey question 8 was developed to learn the number of sworn, full-time police 
officers in the police departments of Bergen County, NJ. Table 14 shows the number of 
sworn police officers and the frequency of agencies reporting that number of personnel. 
Table 14 
Number and Frequency of Police Oflcers in Municipal Police Departments of Bergen 
County, NJ. 
Police Officers n % 
12 2 4.5 
13 4 8.9 
15 3 6.7 
16 1 2.2 
17 1 2.2 
18 5 11.1 
20 4 8.9 
21 1 2.2 
22 5 11.1 
24 1 2.2 
26 1 2.2 
28 1 2.2 
3 1 3 6.7 
32 2 4.5 
37 2 4.5 
43 1 2.2 
44 1 2.2 
45 1 2.2 
46 1 2.2 
48 1 2.2 
50 1 2.2 
63 1 2.2 
65 1 2.2 
109 1 2.2 
Total 45 (N) 100. 
Table 15 shows the responses listed in Table 14 which were derived from survey 
question 8 that have been recoded for statistical analyses. Recoding was done using a 
statistical collapse with natural and logical break points to create a grouping system of a 
small number of police officers (1-20), medium number (21-30) and large number (31 or 
more). Recoded responses were used for later statistical analyses. 
Table 15 
Recoded Responses: Number and Frequency of Full-Time Police Officers in Municipal 
Police Departments of Bergen County, NJ. 
Number of Police n % 
-Number 
(1-20 Full-time Police Officers) 
Medium Number 
(21-30 Full-time Police Officers) 
Large Number 
(3 1 or More Full-time Police Officers) 
Total 45 (N) 100. 
Survey question 9 provided information on the (2007) operating budgets in U S  
dollars of municipal police departments in Bergen County, NJ. Given that each of the 
police departments surveyed listed a different dollar amount, only the recoded data were 
reported in the current study. Original data were collapsed into low total operating 
budget ($0.00 - $250,000.00), medium total ($250,000.00 - $3,000,000.00), and high 
total ($3,000,00 1.00 or more). 
Of the 45 responding police administrators 40 (89%) answered survey question 9. 
Of the 40 responses, 31 (78%) of the operating budgets were in the low and medium 
ranges. This represents almost 78 % of the responses. Only nine of the agencies reported 
having a budget in the high range of $3,000,001 .OO or more, representing approximately 
22.5 % of the responses. Table 16 shows the recoded data from survey question 9. 
Recoded Responses: Total (2007) Operating Budgets of Police Departments in Bergen 
Total Operating Budget 
($0.00 to $250,000.00) 
Medium Total Operating Budget 
($250,001.00 to $3,000,000.00) 
H& Total Operating Budget 
($3,000,001.00 or more) 
Total 40 100. 
* no response n = 5 
Survey question 10 was designed to learn the amounts in U.S. dollars that each 
municipal police department in Bergen County, NJ reported in asset forfeiture funds in 
the year 2007. The year 2007 was selected because it was the last complete year prior to 
this study being conducted. Agency administrator who responded to this survey question 
listed varying amounts that were specific to their agencies only. For that reason, the 
responses were collapsed into manageable categories using natural and logical break 
points. 
The categories used were low forfeiture program ($0.00 - $200.00), medium 
forfeiture program.($201 .OO - $10,000.00) and high forfeiture program ($10,000.00 or 
more). Table 17 shows the response to survey question 10. Of the 45 responding 
agencies, 44 (98%) provided data. 
Table 17 
Recoded Resuonses: 2007 Forfeiture Proaram. Seized Funds as Reuorted bv Police 
- , 
Departments in Bergen County, NJ 
Forfeiture Category n % 
Low Forfeiture Program 
-
($0.00 - $200.00) 
Medium Forfeiture Program 
($201.00 - $10,000.00) 
H~J& Forfeiture Program 
($10,001.00 or more) 
Total 
Survey question 11 was created to determine the number of calls for service that 
each municipal police agency reported they had received or responded to in 2007. For 
reporting purposes each of the agencies reported a different total of calls for service. 
These numbers were broken into workable categories, again using a statistical collapse 
based on natural and logical break off points. These new categories were low annual 
service calls (0-10,000), medium annual service calls (10,001-15,000) and high annual 
service calls (15,001 or more). Table 18 shows the recoded data only for responses to 
survey question 1 1. 
Table 18 
Recoded Responses: 2007 Annual Service Calls as Reported bv Police Departments in 
Service Calls n % 
Low Annual Service Calls 
-
(0- 10,000) 
Medium Annual Service Calls 
(10,001-15,000) 
Annual Service Calls 
(15,001 or more) 
Total 45 (N) 100. 
Reliability Estimates 
After the completed surveys were returned to the researcher and the descriptive 
statistics were derived from them, a Cronbach's Alpha test was used to determine a 
reliability coefficient for responses to survey questions 8,9, 10 and 11. The questions 
were grouped to perform the internal reliability because according to Gliem and Gliem 
(2003) single-item reliabilities are generally very low. The resulting Cronbach's Alpha 
was .75. Cronbacb's alpha reliability estimate normally ranges between 0 and 1. 
Although there actually is no lower limit to the coefficient, the closer Cronbach's Alpha 
coefficient is to 1 .O, the greater the internal consistency of the items in the scale (Gliem & 
Gliem, 2003). 
George and Mallery (2003) provided the following rules of thumb in reference to 
Cronbacb's Alpha scores: "- > .9 -Excellent, - > .8 - Good, - > .7 - Acceptable, - > .6 
- Questionable, - > .5 -Poor, and < .5 -Unacceptable" (p. 231). Thus, for the current 
work, with the low N (45) the .75 is considered highly acceptable. 
Answering Research Question 1 
Research question 1 asked how have training efforts changed for police 
preparedness in responding to active-shooter situations in schools to create a safer 
learning environment for children since the September 1, 2005 training mandate issued 
by the Bergen County Prosecutor's Office? (a) How are training efforts exposing officers 
to realistic environments? (b) How have police departments augmented response 
capabilities on the topic? 
Descriptive statistics reported earlier in this chapter have shown that training 
efforts have changed for police preparedness to respond to active-shooter situations in 
schools to create safer learning environments since the September 1,2005 training 
mandate, in the amount of training required by police department administrators. Of the 
45 surveys returned to the researcher with survey question 6 answered, 43 (96%) 
indicated that the police agency required training in active-shooter response either 
monthly, quarterly, bi-annually or yearly. Only 2 of the 45 reporting agencies responded 
that it was never required to train in these response tactics. 
Research question l(a) asked how training efforts are exposing officers to realistic 
environments. This was answered by survey question 4. Of the 45 responding police 
department administrators 39 (87%) indicated that their officers had participated in 
training in empty schools. This type of training is realistic as it is places officers into a 
real setting and creates familiarity for the police officers for responses during emergency 
conditions. 
Question l(b) asked how police departments have augmented response 
capabilities. Survey question 3 was designed to answer this question. It was learned that 
42 of the 45 responding police department administrators indicated that their agency had 
purchased ballistic shields to augment their officers' response to a critical incident of this 
sort. Thirty six of the 45 responding agencies reported their agencies had purchased 
carbine or patrol rifles to further enhance response capabilities. At a reduced percentage 
agencies reported purchasing other equipment items such as; ballistic helmets, battering , 
rams, bolt cutters, Hallagan or pry bars, and sledge hammers. 
Answering Research Question 2 
Research question 2 was also answered using descriptive statistics. The question 
asked why are police departments implementing or not implementing the Standardization 
of Patrol Based Response to Active-Shooter Situations model policy? This question was 
answered by responses to survey question 7. Reoccurring themes developed from the 
responses showed why agencies adopted the model policy: (a) standardization or (b) 
having all police officers trained in the same tactics. It is apparent that police department 
administrators are aware of the importance of having standard practices that all officers 
can be taught. The reality of a critical incident is that neighboring jurisdictions will also 
respond to supplement the response capability of the municipality suffering the crisis. 
The additional responding officers need to know the same fundamental tactics the 
officers in the jurisdiction in crisis know. In this respect police officers from various 
municipalities can form ad hoc teams to respond to the crisis appropriately. 
Reasons stated for not adopting the model policy as distributed were that police 
departments already had a similar policy in place prior to the distribution of the model 
policy. Other agencies created similar policies that were more specifically tailored to the 
need of their specific jurisdiction. And lastly others stated they used parts of the model 
policy to develop their own policy. 
Answering Research Question 3 
To answer research question 3 the researcher used Chi-square ( ~ 2 )  statistical 
analyses to determine which factors account for the variability in the number of police 
officers designated to train others in active-shooter response and the frequency of training 
being done in police departments in active-shooter preparation in schools (see Appendix 
F) . 
After recoding all data in the responses to survey questions 8,9, 10, and 11 into 
three categories, those responses were independent variables for Chi-square ( ~ 2 )  
statistical analyses. The responses to survey questions 5 and 6 were also recoded to 
provide the researcher with dependant variables for analysis. According to Witte and 
Witte (2004) an independent variable is manipulated by the investigator, and a dependant 
variable is measured, counted, or recorded by the investigator. 
In the first statistical analysis completed, the number of sworn full time police 
officers was used as an independent variable and the number of police officers trained to 
train other police officers was used as the dependant variable. The Chi-square (;O) 
statistical analysis results indicated a value of 2.47 (df = 4) and a p value of (sig.) ,650 
(no statistical significance). In other words, the number of full-time sworn police officers 
in a municipal police department in Bergen County, NJ does not seem to have an effect 
on the number of police officers in the agency that are trained to train other police 
officers in active-shooter response tactics. 
In the second statistical analysis completed, the total operating budget of a police 
department was used as an independent variable and the number of police officers trained 
to train other police officers was used as the dependant variable. A Chi-square ( ~ 2 )  
statistical analysis indicated a value of 2.72 (df = 4) and a p value of (sig.) ,604 (no 
statistical significance). Results show that the total operating budget of a municipal 
police department in Bergen County, NJ does not seem to have an effect on the number 
of police officers trained to train other police officers in active-shooter response tactics. 
In the third statistical analysis completed, the number in U.S. dollars in forfeiture 
funds reported from municipal police departments in Bergen County, NJ for the year 
2007 was used as an independent variable and the number of police officers trained to 
train other police officers in active-shooter response tactics was used as a dependant 
variable. The Chi-square (@) statistical analysis results were statistically significant, 
unlike the other two analyses. Results indicated a value of 17.68 (df = 4) and a p value of 
(sig.) ,001. In much social science research, statistical significance is indicated at p I .05, 
so .001 indicates statistical significance (Witte & Witte, 2004). 
It appears that the amount of dollars reported by the police agencies in asset 
forfeiture influences the number of police officers the agency has trained to train other 
police in active-shooter response tactics: This seized money seems to be used for 
additional police training. As is normally the case in asset forfeiture at the municipal 
police level, seized money is maintained in an account by the county prosecutor's office 
for approved usage by the municipal police department. This money can be approved by 
the county prosecutor's office to be allocated for items and expenditures outside the 
normal operating budget of the agency. Training typically falls under this realm. Based 
on this finding one can assume that training in municipal police departments may he paid 
for by seized forfeiture funds. 
In the fourth statistical analysis completed, the number of annual service calls for 
the year 2007 was used as the independent variable and the number of police officers 
trained to train other police officers in active-shooter response tactics was used as a 
dependant variable. Chi-square ( ~ 2 )  statistical analysis results indicated a value of ,868 
(df = 4) and a p value of (sig.) ,929 (no statistical significance). The number of calls for 
service in 2007 had no effect on the number of police officers trained to train other police 
officers in active-shooter response tactics. 
In the fifth statistical analysis, the number of sworn full-time police officers was 
used as an independent variable and the amount of required training in active-shooter 
tactics was used as the dependent variable. The Chi-square ( ~ 2 )  statistical analysis 
indicated a value of 7.38 (df = 4) and a p value of (sig.) ,117 (no statistical significance). 
The p value indicated a lack of statistical significance. The number of full-time sworn 
police officers had no effect on the amount of required training in active-shooter response 
tactics. 
In the sixth statistical analysis, the total operating budget of a police department 
was used as an independent variable and the amount of required training in active-shooter 
tactics was used for the dependent variable. The Chi-square ( ~ 2 )  statistical analysis 
indicated a value of 11.95 (df = 4) and a p value of (sig.) ,018 which was statistically 
significant. Again, the result of the statistical analysis is showing a relationship between 
available money and training. There appears to be a relationship between the total 
operating budget and the amount of training being done by police officers in active- 
shooter response tactics in Bergen County, NJ. 
In the seventh statistical analysis, the amount of dollars reported by the police 
agencies in asset forfeiture was used as the independent variable and the amount of 
required training in active-shooter tactics used for the dependent variable. The Chi- 
Square ( ~ 2 )  statistical analysis indicated a value of 5.36 (df = 4) and a p value (sig.) ,252 
(no statistical significance). The statistical analysis showed that there is no relationship 
between the amount of dollars in forfeiture funds reported and the amount of required 
training in active-shooter response tactics. 
In the eighth and final statistical analysis, the number of calls for service reported 
for the year 2007 was used as the independent variable and the amount of required 
training in active-shooter response tactics was used as the dependant variable. The Chi- 
Square ( ~ 2 )  statistical analysis indicated a value of 8.93 (df = 4) and a p value (sig.) ,063 
(no statistical significance). However, the p value being within ,013 of an indication of 
statistical significance does warrant some explanation. It appeared that although there is 
not a statistically significant relationship between the number of calls for service reported 
by police officers and the amount of active-shooter tactics training being required it does 
seem that a relationship on some level does exist. The number of calls for service does 
seem to have a relationship at some level to the amount of training being done. Busier 
police departments are going to be less available to do as much training as those that are 
not as busy. If the number of calls for service is greater in one agency, their officers are 
needed to respond to calls for service and would be unable to become unavailable to 
participate in training. 
Summary 
In Chapter IV, the researcher used several sections such as an introduction, 
collection of data, data and findings, descriptive statistics, reliability, answering research 
question 1, answering research question 2, answering research question 3 to present 
information. The reported descriptive statistics learned from the survey instrument that 
had been distributed to all of the municipal police departments in Bergen County, NJ 
presented an interesting look at the types of equipment purchases, training being done 
and policy changes made as a result of the distribution of the model policy discussed 
throughout. 
The researcher also reported on the Chi-square ( ~ 2 )  statistical analyses done to 
determine any relationships between the indicated dependant and independent variables 
of this study. Those analyses indicted two statistically significant relationships. The first 
was between the amount of forfeiture funds reported by municipal police departments 
and the number of police officers trained to train other police officers in active-shooter 
response tactics. The second statistically significant relationship found was between the 
total operating budget of municipal police departments in Bergen County, NJ and the 
amount of training being done in active-shooter response tactics. 
Chapter V will include an introduction, summary of findings, discussion, 
conclusions, recommendations for policies and practices, and future study. 
Chapter V 
INTRODUCTION, SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, DISCUSSION, CONCLUSIONS, 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR POLICIES AND PRACTICES, AND FUTURE STUDY 
Introduction 
This study was developed from the personal interest of the researcher in police 
tactics to respond to active-shooter situations. In beginning the study, the researcher 
determined that the focus would be on municipal police departments of Bergen County, 
NJ. In 2008 the researcher was a police supervisor in a municipal police department in 
Bergen County and in this capacity was responsible to train other police officers in these 
tactics. 
The purpose for this study was to explore the influence that the Bergen County 
Prosecutor's Office (BCPO) Directive 05-01 had on the training and future preparations 
of all sworn police officers in Bergen County, New Jersey in response to active-shooter 
situations in the schools of their jurisdictions. Because attendance in schools is 
mandatory for the children to age 16 in Bergen County, New Jersey the municipal police 
departments of the county must provide a safe learning environment while children are in 
attendance. 
The researcher sought a suitable survey instrument designed to gather appropriate 
information to answer the research questions at the foundation of the study. These 
research questions were: 
1. How have training efforts changed for police preparedness in responding to 
active-shooter situations in schools to create a safer learning environment for children 
since the September 1,2005 training mandate issued by the Bergen County Prosecutor's 
Office (BCPO)? (a) How are training efforts exposing officers to realistic environments? 
(b) How have police departments augmented response capabilities on the topic? 
2. Why are police departments implementing or not implementing the 
Standardization of Patrol Based Response to Active-Shooter Situations model policy? 
3 .  What factors account for the variability in the number of police officers 
designated to train others in active-shooter response and the frequency of training being 
done in police departments in active-shooter preparation in schools? 
The researcher located the United States Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice 
Statistics (USDOJ), Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics 
(LEMAS) survey instrument. With permission from the USDOJ, the LEMAS survey 
instrument was amended and the questions specifically tailored for the needs of the 
current study. A revised survey instrument was developed with the assistance of a jury of 
experts in the field of law enforcement. The survey was revised through a continuous 
flow of dialogue between the researcher and the jury of experts. The survey instrument 
consisted of 11 questions and was redistributed as a pilot study for feedback, as was 
reported in chapter 111 in greater detail. After the determination that the final 11 question 
survey was to be distributed to the target population (N = 68), it was mailed to all of the 
municipal police departments in Bergen County, NJ. The mailing took place on 
December 18,2008 and in the attached letter of solicitation it was requested that the 
voluntary participants return the survey to the researcher by January 7,2009. Through 
the use of the survey the guiding questions were then answered in chapter IV. 
Summary of Findings 
The descriptive statistics from the present study developed a picture of what has 
been done by police agencies in Bergen County to prepare for an active-shooter event in 
a school. Prior to the distribution of the model policy more than 50% of the police 
departments in Bergen County did not have any type of plan in effect for dealing with 
this type of crisis in a school. This policy then forced the remaining police agencies to 
either adopt the distributed model policy or develop their own plan for implementation. 
Through this study it was also learned that 86% of the agencies that already had 
response plans prior to the distribution of the model policy, had also included a mutual 
aid plan to get assistance from neighboring jurisdictions when the crisis occurred. This is 
a clear example of forward thinking on the part of the administrators. 
In addition, the respondent police agencies also understood the importance of 
radio communications interoperability with the neighboring jurisdictions. This was 
evidenced by 93% of the police departments creating radio communications 
interoperability with neighboring agencies as a result of the distributed model policy. 
This allows for multiple jurisdictions to communicate with one another on the same radio 
frequency to provide for faster and more direct radio communications. 
This study shed light on the types of equipment police departments made as a 
result of the model policy distribution. It was indicated that 93% of the agencies that 
responded reported purchasing ballistic shields, 80% purchased carbine or patrol rifles, 
and 76% reported purchasing ballistic helmets. 
As for training, 87% of the police departments reported training in empty schools 
in their jurisdictions. This creates familiarization with the interior and exterior of the 
schools which could make the difference of saving a life during a crisis situation. 
Sadly, only 20% of the police departments reported training as being mandatory 
on a quarterly basis, 22.2% on a bi-annual basis, and still only 42% required training on a 
yearly basis. This is simply not enough to get good at tactics. At best once or twice a 
year can only help to refresh your tactics. It is hardly enough to make improvements and 
become skilled in what is being taught and trained. 
A Cronbach's Alpha test was used to determine a reliability coefficient for 
responses to survey questions 8,9,  10 and 11. The questions were grouped to perform 
the internal reliability because according to Gliem and Gliem (2003) single-item 
reliabilities are generally very low. The resulting Cronbach's Alpha was .75. For the 
current study, with the low N (45) the .75 is considered highly acceptable. 
The following relationships were determined to be lacking statistical significance: 
(a) the number of sworn full time police officers as an independent variable and the 
number of police officers trained to train other police officers as the dependant variable, 
(b) the total operating budget of a police department as an independent variable and the 
number of police officers trained to train other police officers as the dependant variable, 
(c) the number of annual service calls for the year 2007 as the independent variable and 
the number of police officers trained to train other police officers in active-shooter 
response tactics as a dependant variable, (d) the number of sworn full-time police 
officers as an independent variable and the amount of required training in active-shooter 
tactics as the dependent variable, (e) the amount of dollars reported by the police 
agencies in asset forfeiture as the independent variable and the amount of required 
training in active-shooter tactics as the dependent variable, and (f) the number of calls for 
service reported for the year 2007 as the independent variable and the amount of required 
training in active-shooter response tactics as the dependant variable. 
The present study also determined two statistically significant findings. The first 
of these findings was the relationship between the amount of forfeiture funds reported by 
municipal police departments in 2007 and the number of police officers trained to train 
other police officers in active-shooter response tactics. Based on results from this 
research, the more seizure funds available to police department administrators the more 
police officers in their agencies are being trained to train the other police officers in their 
respective police departments in active-shooter response tactics. 
The second statistically significant relationship found was between the total 
operating budget of municipal police departments in Bergen County, NJ and the amount 
of training being done in active-shooter response tactics. Both findings indicate that there 
is a direct relationship between available finances and training of police officers in 
active-shooter response tactics. Simply put, police departments with larger budgets and 
more available money are training more often than agencies with smaller budgets and 
less money available. Therefore the assumption can be made that the more money 
allocated toward training will better prepare police officers to be able to respond to and 
effectively deal with an active-shooter situation in a school. 
Discussion 
If Ouchi (1977) is correct in the assumption that structure influences behavior, the 
conclusion can be made that more training designed to train police officers to respond to 
active-shooter situations will create better prepared police. Mintzberg's (1979) theory of 
action planning accounts for how a job is done rather than specifically relying on the 
outcome of the operation. With this theory in mind the assertion can be made that when 
more police officers are designated to train others in essential response tactics then the 
responding police should be more likely to he successful in the completion of their 
mission, which is to save lives. 
Scanlon (2001) described the premise of an active-shooter, who is seriously 
wounding andlor killing people, and the need for the first responding officers to make a 
rapid assessment of the incident and make entry to stop the suspect[s]. This ability to 
rapidly assess and form an ad hoc team is essential to properly ending these types of 
crisis situations. However, police departments in Bergen County are not devoting enough 
time, energy and resources to training toward this end and if the time comes when the 
tactics are needed there will be a break down in their capability to bring the situation to a 
quick resolution. There needs to be more frequent training. 
Giduck (2005) recommended that police try to change their rnindset from police 
officer dealing with a crime scene to a military unit dealing with a battlefield. If 42% of 
police departments are training but once a year in the necessary skills and tactics it would 
likely be an impossible task to effectively train to appropriately handle these situations as 
they may arise. Training once a year serves the officers more as a reminder of tactics 
rather than a training of learned skills. Training is a repetitive process where skills are 
ingrained through repetition, practice, critique, and correction. Once a year is simply not 
enough for officers to become efficient in the necessary skills they will need to possess to 
work safely and swiftly to bring a conflict of this nature to an end. 
Lloyd (2000) called it a moral obligation for police to make entry and intervene in 
an ongoing active-shooter situation. The purchases described in this study of tactical and 
entry equipment displays the commitment of Bergen County Police Departments toward 
this end. The entry equipment purchased offers the police the ability to make a forced 
entry to breach any location to quickly gain access and begin their mission. The tactical 
equipment is a testament to properly equipping the officers that will most certainly be 
placed in harms way to complete their mission. Although there is no specific 
recommendation on equipment purchases the more tools at the disposal of the police 
officers the easier it will be to do their job. 
Coordination and control as presented by Bolman and Deal (2003) helps to ensure 
that diverse efforts of individuals and units mesh. This theory is the premise behind 
having a unified response plan for police first responders to violent school incidents. 
Through the use of structure, police officers from various agencies are able to work 
safely and effectively together. This goal is met by the establishment of the 
Standardization of Patrol Based Response to Active-Shooter Situations model policy 
distributed by the Bergen County Prosecutor's Office. It seemed to be a priority of the 
police administrators when they indicated reasons why they adopted the model policy, 
that all police officers are aware of the same basic tactics. The reality is that multiple 
jurisdictions will respond to the same scene to assist in bringing the crisis to a resolution. 
This can be done by training all police officers who may respond in the same tactics so 
each can work with any other. 
Conclusions 
It seems clear to the researcher that the police administrators that provided 
answers to the distributed survey questionnaire at the foundation of this study are quite 
aware of what needs to be done in the event of an active-shooter situation in a school of 
their jurisdiction. What seems to be lost is that these tactics when initially trained are 
perishable skills, and like anything else that is taught, it will go away when not properly 
reinforced. What is lacking in Bergen County is the correct measure of reinforcement of 
the tactics. Police officers are simply not training enough to become really prepared and 
efficient at the necessary skill sets to tackle the situations which have formed the basis of 
this study. 
Numerous documents have been written based on research conducted on who 
commits these violent acts in our nation's schools. Klein (2005) asserted that popular 
discourse addressed school shootings almost obsessively, but continued to omit the role 
gender plays in these crimes. New research has suggested that this omission was 
ignoring a key element: a significant number of the boys' own stated reasons for this 
violence clearly pointed to premeditated violence specifically involving girls (Klein, 
2005). This researcher has found that aside from a rare exception or two, predominately 
young white males from the ages 11 - 18 years old, mostly loners and with relatively 
easy access to firearms are the perpetrators (Scanlon, 2001). With the type of 
information collected by agencies like the FBI in their July, 1999 paper entitled "The 
school shooter: a threat assessment perspective" (O'Toole, 1999) and the International 
Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) in their "Guide for Preventing and Responding to 
School Violence" retrieved from the IACP website in February 2007 (Kramen, Massey, 
& Timm, 1999), school officials have been preparing for violent students, with the 
assistance of their law enforcement partners. Identification of the potential offenders is 
the first step toward limiting this kind of behavior in the future. Prevention can come 
from close partnerships between law enforcement and schools in early detection of 
potential assaults as well as in sharing information about those identified as having the 
potential to be involved in this behavior. Sending better prepared police to respond to 
these crisis situations in the schools is a direct result of the amount of money that is being 
allotted for training. ' 
For law enforcement personnel to take their tactics to the next level, they must 
begin now to prepare for future acts of school violence and/or terrorism. As a result of 
this research project the researcher now knows that the amount of funds allocated toward 
training is going to make the difference in sending better prepared police officers into a 
potential battle. No one thought it would have been possible for the acts of September 
11,2001 to have been perpetrated against the US, on US soil. After the events of 
911 112001 occurred, the law enforcement community was left with the realization that the 
US was no longer immune from the acts of violence the rest of the world has had to 
endure for centuries. Future acts of active shooting in schools and terrorism are a reality 
and police officers must be prepared to face them. 
Just as the law enforcement community has learned lessons from the Columbine 
High School tragedy, so too have the next wave of potential attackers and terrorists been 
planning their next attack. Through after action investigations, it is known that school 
attackers and terrorists study police responses and know all about tactics the likes of 
active-shooter, QUAD, and IARD that have been discussed herein. US law enforcement 
must begin now to prepare for potential attacks by active-shooters and terrorists on our 
most precious targets, our children (Giduck, 2005). What could make American citizens 
feel more vulnerable than an attack at a school? Persons in other countries have been 
dealing with this reality for years and are prepared to handle situations like this at a 
school. Countries like Israel have placed armed guards on every school bus and in every 
school. School buses are armored to minimize potential injuries from an attack. School 
campuses are fortified territory (Giduck, 2005). Short of having armed guards on 
armored school buses and inside schools, more must be done to train police in response 
tactics. To accomplish this goal more money must be directed toward the training of 
tactics like those proposed in the Standardization of Patrol Based Response for Active- 
Shooter Situations. 
Law enforcement policy makers need also to begin cooperative efforts with 
military units for training in handling battlefield type conflict, much like they would be 
facing in a terrorist attack on a school. Terrorism experts like Giduck who authored 
"Terror at Beslan" (2005) conclude that the terrorists will attack the US again. It is also 
likely that a potential target will be an unsuspecting school. The terrorists are not at all 
like the loner child who brings a gun to school. They come with tested and rehearsed 
battle plans, reinforcements, surveillance and counter surveillance measures in place 
(Giduck, 2005). 
The terrorist's goal is not to he arrested or contained; it is to kill as many victims 
and police responders as possible to gain notoriety for their cause (Giduck, 2005). Our 
future is now: Policing in the US must adapt now for the threats of the future which will 
most certainly be at the hands of terrorists who will, like they have in the past, attack 
when and where we are least expecting them to. That certainly could be a school. Law 
enforcement personnel need to make more adaptations to their training now to be able to 
respond to an event they will face (Giduck, 2005). With one hurdle cleared the next one 
is right in front of us. 
Recommendations for Policies and Practices 
Since police officers may face the need to respond to a critical incident (active- 
shooter situation) in the schools of their jurisdictions, the responsibility for training in 
response tactics becomes increasingly paramount. In that respect all responding police 
officers to an active-shooter situation, must at least be aware of the same tactics. In 
Bergen County, NJ this topic was addressed in 2005 when the prosecutor's office 
distributed a memo requiring a unified and consistent active-shooter response. 
However, this researcher believes that more needs to be done than just blanket 
familiarization with a response policy. As was discovered in this research there is 
disparity in the amount and type of training being done. Not enough training is taking 
place to respond effectively to an active-shooter situation. More training needs to 
become the rule rather than the exception. If not enough training is being conducted, the 
training and interest will not be sustained. When times get really tough, in a critical 
situation the natural tendency is to revert to the original process of how things were done 
in the past (Palazzolo, 2009). Here, how thing3 were done in the past simply will not be 
enough to save lives effectively. 
Because the study of law enforcement tactics and strategy is in its relative infancy 
and some situations only now have begun to be seriously studied, there is a lack of 
information available on police training for active-shooter situations (O'Brien, 2008a). 
The researcher located no research to determine what the best tactics are to respond to 
active-shooters in schools and the science of the study police tactics. Since no data are 
available to study to make a truly scientific determination to apply to policy the advice of 
the experts like Giduck must be followed. More training is certainly necessary to provide 
the community with a prepared and capable police department. 
Based on the findings of this study more money and effort needs to be directed 
toward training budgets. Police departments with more funds available are doing more 
training. Since the critical incidents that may present themselves are not specific to 
jurisdictions with sufficient training budgets, funds must come from somewhere to 
prepare police to respond to crisis situations. If police departments are unable to fund 
their own training, a county-wide or state-wide training program should be available to 
police departments for continuous training. 
The Bergen County Prosecutor's Office should establish and maintain a county- 
wide training division. One responsibility for this training division should be providing 
standard and mandatory continuing training to the police in the county in mutual aid and 
critical incident responses. The training should be provided at not cost to the local police 
departments of the county to ensure cost to the agency is not preventing officers from 
being trained in the most current tactics available. 
Future Study 
Numerous research projects and studies have been conducted on the topic of 
school violence prevention. But what happens when it happens? What about when the 
prevention efforts are not effective to stop the violence before it happens? There needs to 
be research on the best practices of police response tactics to school shooter situations. 
Special attention needs to be paid to the evolution of tactics and how they are changing 
based on prior responses and the successfulness of the police operations in those 
incidents. To accomplish this S.W.A.T. tactics should be studied to determine which, is 
the best fit to adapt to train to patrol officers. 
More research needs to be done in the topic area of police training and the amount 
of funds required for that training to be successful. A comprehensive study needs to be 
conducted to determine the dollar amount that needs to be allocated per police officer to 
allow for similarly trained police in effective tactics. An in depth study should be 
focused on tactical equipment and which pieces are best for police to use during crisis 
situations. 
There should be future studies done to determine what police officers in other 
counties in New Jersey are doing to prepare for these types of situations they may face in 
schools. There should also be a study done to compare what is being done from state to 
state and as a result try to determine which training is the most cost effective, the most 
beneficial and which fits best for patrol officers. 
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List of 68 Bergen County Municipal Police Departments 
Agency Number of officers Agency Number of officers 
Allendale 
Alpine 
Bergenfield 
Bogota 
Carlstadt 
Cliffside Park 
Closter 
Cresskill 
Demarest 
Dumont 
East Rutherford 
Edgewater 
Elmwood Park 
Emerson 
Englewood 
Englewood Cliffs 
Fair Lawn 
Fairview 
Fort Lee 
Franklin Lakes 
Garfield 
Glen Rock 
Hackensack 
Harrington Park 
Hasbrouck Heights 
Haworth 
Hillsdale 
Ho-Ho-Kus 
Leonia 
Little Ferry 
Lodi 
Lyndhurst 
Mahwah 
Maywood 
Midland Park 
~ o n t v i l e  
Moonachie 
New Milford 
North Arlington 
Northvale 
Nonvood 
Oakland 
Old Tappan 
Oradell 
Palisades Park 
Paramus 
Park Ridge 
Ramsey 
Ridgefield 
Ridgefield Park 
Ridgewood 
River Edge 
River Vale 
Rochelle Park 
Rutherford 
Saddle Brook 
Saddle River 
South Hackensack 
Teaneck 
Tenafly 
Upper Saddle River 
Waldwick 
Wallington 
Washington Township 
Westwood 
Wood-Ridge 
Woodcliff Lake 
Wyckoff 
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Jell'Ditm 
1 ! 7 Knolls Road 
Dear Mr. Dino: 
'The purpose of this letter is to p n t  you pmission to use o limited numbcr of questk 
from the BJS Law Enforcement Maaagement and Administrative Slatistics (I FMAS) 
survey qwauonuairr firr your study of policc dcpenments in Bcrgsn County. Ncw Jer 
This pwnissinn is yranlcd fnr the purposcs of rile R q e n  Cuunty data collectiuu only 
and any future &la cullecrions basal un thz I.EMAS survcy instnrrnenl will also requ 
a request to BJS for permission lo use the I.EMAS questions. If any l i ihcr infnrmali 
is needed reganling this letter ol'prtuiasion, please contact me by email at 
.-%tiru~.reave%Nsdqj.~;-or by phone at 202-616-3287. 
1 EMAS Program hfanagcr 
Bureau of histice Statislics 
I1.S. Damanem of Jumice 
September l5.20U8 
John L. Molinelli. Prnsecutor 
k r y e n  County Pms~utor ' s  O l l i ~  
10 Main Skeet 
Ilackensack, SJ 07601 
Dear Prosecutor Molinelli. 
My name is  Jeiftcy D i m  I mn a 1 ; year veteran Police w e a n 1  with thc 
Mahwah Police Deportment. I .m alsn a &xlciral d d a t c  a1 Seton H ~ l l  IInivmiQ'. 1 
nm paporing my dissertation on police p~panulncss to rcspond to active shooter 
situntions in schwls 01'Uergen County, N. Thc dissertation is focl~wd on how thc 
municipl pulice duparuncnts of Hergen County are preparing to respond lo an activc 
shouler situation siucc tlw distribution of your directive marked 05-01 Actiw Shootcr 
Policy Initintive. 
The p w p c  of this ietkr is lo rqucsl your pcnnission for me tn send each of the 
68 municipal police agcncics of Bergen County n copy of a survey qurstio& lo ask 
hem lo complclc and rcturn tn me. The s w e y  contains qwlionu borrowed hm the 
L.sw Enfnrcemcnt Management and ~Uminislrruivr Statistics survey and qucstion~ thmt 
were prepared with the assistwe of a jury ol'cxprts in the fields of policing police 
tactics. and emergency mamgemenl. 
I'hiu rlscarch study has k e n  approved by Seton I I d  University. All information 
gatherd will be kept strictly confidential and no identifying characteristics of any ngency 
will be asked for or dissemi~tcd.  
I ~vould like lo lake 1h1s opportunity to thank you for my and dl considwdliun 
you give this request. If h r c  arc any questions I can he c n n k k d  mytine at 973650- 
IlZh5. 
L MOIIN~UI 
Cuvnh Promulor Office of the County Prosecutor 
County of Bergen 
HACKENSACK. NEW JERSEY 07601 Jolw L. Hmwh UI 
(201) 646-1300 Tnsl L h ~ t  
Joseph Macellam 
Chmt orlktallvn 
October 8.2008 
Mr. Je fhy  Din0 
1 17 Knolls Road 
Bloomingdale, NJ 07403 
Re: Active Shooter Preparedness Survey 
Dear Mr. Dino, 
In regard to your request to send a questionnaire to the municipal police departments in 
Bergen County to assess how the departments are prepared to respond to an active shooter 
situation. that request, and the form proposed by you are approved. It is my understanding that 
you are sending out this questionnaire in furtherance of your doctoral degree at Seton Hall 
University. This office approves of the questionnaire that you wish to use, and also is interested 
in the results that will flow from the responses that you receive. Please provide this office with a 
summary of your tindings, if possible. I commend you on yow choice of topic, and wish you 
much success in your efforts to achieve your doctoral degree. If at any time I, or this office, can 
be of any further assistance to you please do not hesitate to contact me at 201 -226-5104. 
William J. Galda 
First Assistant Prosecutor 
REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OF RESEARCH, DEMONSTRATION OR 
RELATED ACTIVITIES INVOLVING HUMAN SUBJECTS 
PROJECT TITLE: A ShdV in Police hemredness to Resoond to Active Shooter Situations to 
Provide a Safer Lea& Environment in tbe Schools of Bernen Countv. New Jmev. 
Dr. C n a b  millerr f h G  ,Lh& L 1011W 
RESEARCHER'S ADVISOR ORDEPARTMENTAL SUPERVISOR DATE 
1Please pint or type out name below -lure^  
DIRECTOR. 0 
SETON W UNlVERSlN INSTINTICt+U 
R M E W  BOARD FOR HUMAN SUBJECTS RESEARCH 
Jefiky Dino 
117 Knolls Road 
Bloomingdale, NJ 07403 
December 17,2008 
Dear Mr. Dino, 
The Seton Hall University lnstitutional Review Board has reviewed the information you 
have submitted addressing the concerns for your proposal entitled "A Study in Police 
Preparedness to Report to Active Shooter Situations to Provide a Safer Learning 
Environment in the Schools of Bergen County, New Jersey". Your research protocol is 
hereby approved as revlsed thmugh expedited review. The 1RB reserves the right to 
recall the proposal at any time for full review. 
Enclosed for your records are the signed Request for Approval form, and the stamped 
Letter of Solicitation. Make copies only of this stamped letter. 
The Institutional Review Board approval of your research is valid for a one-year period 
from the date of this letter. Durina this time. any changes to the research ~rotocol must 
be reviewed and a~oroved hv the IRB ~ r i o r  to their imdementation. 
Accodmg to federal regulations, continuing review of already approved research is 
mandated to take place at least 12 months after this initial approval. You will receive 
communication from the TRB Office for this several months before the anniversary date 
of your initial approval. 
Thank you for your cooperation. 
In harmony with federal regulations. none of the investigators or research stoffinvolved 
in the study rookpurr in thejinol decision 
Sincerely, 
~rciessor 
Director, Institutional Review Board 
cc: Dr. Charles Achilles 
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Appendix E 
SETON HALL 
I . B .  
UNIVERSITY 
December 18,2CfJ8 
Dear Chief, 
MY name is Jefiev Dino and I am a Sergeant of Police with the Mahwah Police 
~epartmeit.  I am also a doctoral candidate a dissertation at Seton Hall 
University. My study is on Active Shooter preparedness by municipal police 
denanments in Bemen Countv. NJ. The ournose of this letter is to ask for Your assistance - .. . . 
with this project. 
My request is for you to please spare a few minutes out of your day to complete 
the attached survey and mail it back to me by January 7,2008. The survey contains 11 
questions that should not take very much of your time. I can assure you that no part of 
this survev will be seen bv anvone other than me and mv dissertation committee. 
~ i c r  the dam 1s c o ~ ~ ~ ~ c d  from all panwpantr & I  68 munlctpal police 
depanmcnts in Bcrgen Counlyl. the surveys wlll be stored in a locked fire res~slant box in 
my home for three years as iscustomary in doctoral research. Further, all surveys will be 
coded with a control number and your agency name will not appear anywhere on the 
survey. These layers of security are to ensure your anonmitv and reassure vou that vour 
. . 
answers to the questions in the survey will be kept private and confidential. 
After you complete the survey, please mail it back to me using the self addressed 
stamped envelope provided with the survey. 
. 
This shldy has been approved by Seton Hall University's Institutional Review 
Board (IRB) and bv the Berren CountvProsecutors Office. If vou have anv auestions 
- . . 
about the survey or about any of the questions, please do not hesitate to contact me at 
973-650-0565 or my mentor Dr. Charles Achilles 973-761-9668. If you have any 
questions about subject's rights in this research please contact Dr. ~"zicka at the-RB at 
973-313-6314. 
Thank you in advance for your cooperation in my academic endeavor. 
Respectfully 
A, 11 
Jeffrey T. Dino 
Seton Hall UnhremHy 
InsliMional Review Board 
3EC 17 2008 M Date 
OEC 17 mrJ 
Approval Date 
Appendix F 
Crosstabs 
Crosstab 
Case Processing Summary 
Medium 
Low Number Number of 
of Trained Trained 
Officers in Officers in 
Active Shooter Active Shooter 
Q8R ' Q5R 
Q9R " Q5R 
Q10R Q5R 
Ql lR 'Q5R 
Response (0 - Response (3 
2 Officers) Officers) 
28R Small Organization (1 - Count I 9 1 5 
20 ~ull-time Authorized ~ ~ ~ t ~ d  count I 5.8 Positions) % of Total 20.0% 11.1% 
Cases 
Std. Residual I .2 ( -3 
Medium Oraanization Count I 5 1 3 - 
(21-30 Full-time Expected Count 3.8 2.6 
Authorized Positions) % of Total 11.1% 6.7% 
Std. Residual .6 .2 
~ ~ ~- 
Large Organization Count 5 5 
(More than 30 Full-time ~ ~ ~ ~ t ~ d  count 6.8 4.6 
Authorized Positions) % of Total 
11.1% 11.1% 
Total Valid 
Std. Residual -.7 .2 
rota1 Count 19 13 
Expected Count 19.0 13.0 
9h of Total 42.2% 28.9% 
Missing 
N 
68 
68 
68 
68 
N 
45 
40 
44 
45 
High Number 
of Trained 
Officers in 
4ct1ve Shooter 
Response 
(More than 3 
Officers) 
6 
5.8 
13.3% 
.1 
1 
2.6 
2.2% 
-1.0 
6 
4.6 
13.3% 
.6 
13 
13.0 
28.9% 
N 
23 
28 
24 
23 
Percent 
100.0% 
100.0% 
100.0% 
100.0% 
Percent 
66.2% 
58.8% 
64.7% 
66.2% 
Total 
20 
20.0 
44.4% 
9 
9.0 
20.0% 
16 
16.0 
35.6% 
45 
45.0 
100.0% 
Percent 
33.8% 
41.2% 
35.3% 
33.8% 
I N of Valid Cases I 45 1 1 
Chi-square Tests 
a. 5 cells (55.6%) have expected count less than 5. The 
minimum expected count is 2.60. 
Low Number 
of Trained 
Officers in 
Active Shooter 
Res~onse 10 - 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
,650 
,600 
,490 
Pearson Chi-square 
Likelihood Ratio 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
2 Office;) 
29R Low Total Operating Count 11 
Budget ($0 - $250,000) Expected Count 8.6 
% of Total 27.5% 
Std. Residual I .8 
MediumTotal O~erating Count I 4 
Value 
2.473a 
2.753 
,475 
Budget (5250bol - Expected Count 5.4 
$3,000,000) % of Total 10.0% 
Std. Residual -.6 
High Total Operating Count 3 
Budget (More than Expected Count 4.1 
$3,000,000) % of Total 
7.5% 
df 
4 
4 
1 
Std. Residual 
rota1 Count 
Expected Count 18.0 
% of Total 45.0% 
Medium 
Number of 
Trained 
Officers in 
Wive Shooter 
Response (3 
Officers) 
5 
5.7 
12.5% 
-.3 
4 
3.6 
10.0% 
.2 
3 
2.7 
7.5% 
.2 
12 
12.0 
30.0% 
High Number 
of Trained 
Officers in 
4C1ive Shooter 
Response 
(More than 3 
Officers) 
3 
4.8 
7.5% 
-.8 
4 
3.0 
10.0% 
.6 
3 
2.3 
7.5% 
.5 
10 
10.0 
25.0% 
Total 
19 
19.0 
47.5% 
12 
12.0 
30.0% 
9 
9.0 
22.5% 
40 
40.0 
100.0% 
Chi-square Tests 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
,604 
Likelihood Ratio I 2.777 Linear-by-Linear Association 2.086 
a. 6 cells (66.7%) have expected count less than 5. The 
minimum expected count is 2.25. 
df 
4 ' Pearson Chi-square 
N of Valid Cases I 40 
Value 
2.729" 
4 
1 
I 
. I49 596 I 
Crosstab 
Q5R 
%if Total I 22.7% 1 4.5% 1 11.4% 
Low Number 
of Trained 
Officers in 
Active Shooter 
Res~onse 10 - I 2 officers) I &cers) I officers) 
Medium 
Number of 
Trained 
Officers in 
Active Shooter 
Res~onse (3 
210R Low Forfeiture Program - Count 
2007 ($0 - $200) Expected Count 
Std. Residual 1 .O 
High Number 
of Trained 
Officers in 
Active Shooter 
Response 
(More than 3 
2 
5.0 
10 
7.3 
Program - 2007 ($201 - Expected Count 
$10,000) %of Total 
Std. Residual 
High Forfeiture Program - Count 
2007 (More than $10,000) Expected Count 
% of Total 
Expected Count I 19'0 I 12.0 %of Total 43.2% 29.5% 27.3% 
5 
4.6 
Medium Forfeiture count I 4 1 9 1 0 
-1.3 
Std. Residual -.4 -1 .I 
Total 
17 
17.0 
38.6% 
- 
13 
13.0 
29.5% 
- 
14 
14.0 
31 .8% 
- 
44 
44.0 
100.0% 
-
.2 
5.6 
9.1% 
- .7 
5 
6.0 
11.4% 
1.6 
rotai count I 19 1 13 1 12 
3.8 
20.5% 
2.6 
2 
4.1 
4.5% 
3.5 
.O% 
-1.9 
7 
3.8 
15.9% 
Chi-square Tests 
I I I ~ s y m p .  Sig. I I value I df I (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-square 1 17.685a 1 4 ( ,001 
Likelihood Ratio 1 19.551 1 4 1 ,001 I 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association ( 1 .  1 1  1 5 9 1  
Q11R * QSR 
N of Valid Cases I 44 
Crosstab 
I 
I 
Low Number 
of Trained 
Officers in 
Active Shooter 
Res~onse 10 - 
a. 5 cells (55.6%) have expected count less than 5. The 
minimum expected count is 3.55. 
1 2 office&) 
31 I R Low Annual Service count 10 
Calls - 2007 ( 0 - 10,000) Ex~ected Count 8.9 
%of Total I 22.2% 
Std. Residual 
Medium Annual Service Count 
Calls - 2007 (10,001 - Expected Count 
15,000) % of Total 8.9% 
Std. Residual 1 -5 
Hiah Annual Service count I 5 
~ a i i s  - 2007 ( More than Eqected Count I 5.1 15,000) % of Total 11.1% 
Std. Residual 
rota1 count 
Expected Count 
% of Total 42.2% 
Number of of Trained 
Trained Officers in 
Officers Officers Total 
21 
21 .o 
46.7% 
12 
12.0 
26.7% 
12 
12.0 
26.7% 
45 
45.0 
100.0% 
Chi-square Tests 
1 Likelihood Ratio 1 ,883 1 4 1 ,927 
Value 
I Linear-by-Linear Association I 3 5  1 1 I 5 i 2  
N of Valid Cases I 45 
Pearson Chi-square I .86ea ( 4 ( ,929 
- 
df 
a. 4 cells (44.4%) have expected count less than 5. The 
minimum expected count is 3.47. 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Crosstabs 
Case Processing Summary 
Q8R " Q6R 
Q9R * Q6R 
Q1OR " Q6R 
Ql lR 'Q6R 
Cases 
Valid 
N 
45 
40 
44 
45 
Percent 
66.2% 
58.8% 
64.7% 
66.2% 
Missing 
N 
23 
28 
24 
23 
Total 
Percent 
33.8% 
41.2% 
35.3% 
33.8% 
N 
68 
68 
68 
68 
Percent 
100.0% 
100.0% 
100.0% 
100.0% 
Crosstab 
I Q6R I Once a I 
Quarter or 
Monthly Bi-annually 
Q8R Small Organization (1 - Count 5 8 
20 Full-time Authorized Expected count 6.2 4.4 
Positions) % of Total 11.1% 17.8% 
Std. Residual -.5 1.7 
Medium Organization Count I 4 1 1 
(21-30 Full-time Expected Count 2.0 
Authorized Positions) Total I 8 .  1 2.2% 
Std. Residual .7 -.7 
Large Organization Count I 5 1 1 
(More than 30 Full-time Expected Count 3.6 
Authorized Positions) % of Total 
Std. Residual .O -1.4 
rota1 Count 14 10 
Expected Count 14.0 10.0 
% of Total 31.1% 22.2% 
Chi-square Tests 
I I I I ~symp.  Sip. I 1 value 1 df I (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-square 1 7.38Ba 1 4 I .I17 I Likelihood ~ a t i o  ( 7.617 1 4 1 ,107 1 
Once a year 
or Never 
7 
9.3 
15.6% 
-.8 
4 
4.2 
8.9% 
-.l 
10 
7.5 
22.2% 
.9 
21 
21.0 
46.7% 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
N of Valid Cases 
Total 
20 
20.0 
44.4% 
9 
9.0 
20.0% 
16 
16.0 
35.6% 
45 
45.0 
100.0% 
a. 6 cells (66.7%) have expected count less than 5. The 
minimum expected count is 2.00. 
.478 
45 
1 I 
Crosstab 
Quarter or 
I ( Monthly 1 Bi-annually 
1 Q9R Low Total Operating Count I 8 1 2 
I 
Budget ($0 - $250,000) Expected Count 5.7 3.8 
% of Total 20.0% 5.0% 
Std. Residual 1 .O -.9 
MediumTotal Operating Count 2 6 
Budget ($250,001 - Expected Count 3.6 2.4 
$3,000,000) % of Total 5.0% 15.0% 
Std. Residual -3 2.3 
High Total Operating Count 2 0 
Budget (More than Expected Count 2.7 1.8 
$3,000,000) % of Total 
5.0% .O% 
Std. Residual -.4 -1.3 
Total Count 12 8 
Expected Count 12.0 8.0 
% of Total 30.0% 20.0% 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association I 1.811 ( 1 I 178 I 
Chi-square Tests 
Once a year 
or Never 
9 
9.5 
22.5% 
-.2 
Total 
19 
19.0 
47.5% 
12 
12.0 
30.0% 
9 
9.0 
22.5% 
40 
40.0 
100.0% 
Pearson Chi-square 
Likelihood Ratio 
N of Valid Cases I 40 I 
a. 6 cells (66.7%) have expected count less than 5. The 
minimum expected count is 1.80. 
Value 
11 .955a 
12.269 
df 
4 
4 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
.018 
,015 
Crosstab 
Quarter or Once a vear 1 Monthly I Bi-annually I or ~ e b e r  1 Total 
QlOR Low Forfeiture Program - Count I 7 1 4 1 6 1 17 
- 
2007 ($0 - $200) Expected Count 
% of Total 
Std. Residual 
Medium Forfeiture Count 
Program - 2007 ($201 - Expected count 
$10,000) % of Total 
Chi-square Tests 
Std. Residual 
High Forfeiture Program - Count 
2007 (More than $10,000) Expected Count 
% of Total 
Std. Residual 
Total Count 
Expected Count 
% of Total 
5.4 
15.9% 
.7 
3 
4.1 
6.8% 
-.6 
4 
4.5 
9.1% 
-2 
14 
14.0 
31.6% 
Pearson Chi-square 
Likelihood Ratio 
a. 5 cells (55.6%) have expected count less than 5. The 
minimum expected count is 2.95. 
3.9 
9.1% 
.1 
5 
3.0 
11.4% 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
N of Valid Cases 
1.2 
1 
3 2  
2.3% 
-1.2 
10 
10.0 
22.7% 
Value 
5.362a 
5.578 
7.7 
13.6% 
-.6 
5 
5.9 
11.4% 
1.729 
44 
17.0 
38.6% 
13 
13.0 
29.5% 
-.4 
9 
6.4 
20.5% 
1 .O 
20 
20.0 
45.5% 
df 
4 
4 
14 
14.0 
31.8% 
44 
44.0 
100.0% 
Asymp. Sig. 
(Psided) 
,252 
,233 
1 .I89 
Crosstab 
I Q6R 
%if Total 1 17.8% 1 13.3% 
Q11 R Low Annual Service Count 
Calls - 2007 ( 0 - 10,000) Ex~eCted Count 
Monthly 
8 
6.5 
Std. Residual 
Medium Annual Service Count 
Calls - 2007 (10.001 - Expected Count 
15,000) % of Total 
Std. Residual 
High Annual Service Count 
Calls - 2007 ( More than Expected Count 
15.000) % of Total 
Std. Residual 
Total Count 
Expected Count 
% of Total 
Once a year 
or Never 
7 
9.8 
15.6% 
-.9 
4 
5.6 
8.9% 
-.7 
10 
5.6 
22.2% 
1.9 
21 
21.0 
46.7% 
Bi-annually 
6 
4.7 
Chi-square Tests 
Total 
21 
21 .o 
46.7% 
12 
12.0 
26.7% 
12 
12.0 
26.7% 
45 
45.0 
100.0% 
.6 
5 
3.7 
11.1% 
.7 
1 
3.7 
2.2% 
-1.4 
14 
14.0 
31.1% 
.6 
3 
2.7 
6.7% 
.2 
1 
2.7 
2.2% 
-1.0 
10 
10.0 
22.2% 
Pearson Chi-square 
Likelihood Ratio 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
N of Valid Cases 
a. 5 cells (55.6%) have expected count less than 5. The 
minimum expected count is 2.87. 
df 
4 
4 
1 
Value 
8.93ga 
9.482 
5.405 
45 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
.063 
,050 
.020 
